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ARTICLES
THE NOTIONAL BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN
BANKINGt
Patricia A. McCoy *
In the corporate law literature, the notion still persists that the business
judgment rule cuts across industry lines with monolithic force. While a
few commentators have cited banking as an industry in which the busi-
ness judgment rule has contracted, the majority has dismissed the bank-
ing cases as an aberration and an unimportant one at that.' Having
t Copyright Patricia A. McCoy 1995.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. B.A., 1976, Oberlin College; J.D., 1983, University of California (Berkeley).
My warm thanks to my research assistants, Theodore A. Amata, Diana L. Clift, Erika
Crandall, and Glen H. Garrett, for their invaluable assistance. I also wish to express my
gratitude to the Cleveland-Marshall Fund for its financial support and to Marc Gary,
Deborah A. Geier, Gregory A. Mark, Alan Miles Ruben, James G. Wilson, Charles Cad-
well, and the Cleveland-Marshall faculty seminar for their insightful comments.
1. The most important exemplar of the former is Professor Bishop's study a quarter
century ago. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1096 n.63, 1097-99
(1968) (noting that some courts have held bank directors to high standards of diligence).
For authorities that assume that the business judgment rule in banking is largely intact, see
3A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 1035, at 30 (rev. ed. 1994); MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE CORPO-
RATE LAW OF BANKS § 3.2.6, at 230-31 & n.1 (1988); JOHN K. VILLA, BANK DIRECTORS'
OFFICERS' AND LAWYERS' CIVIL LIABILITIES 1-52 to 1-55 (Supp. 1995); D. Franklin Arey,
III, Bank Directors' Duties Under the Common Law of Arkansas, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 629, 637-38 (1988-1989); John P. Austin, Directors of Financial Institutions: Spe-
cial Problems, 31 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1245-46 (1976); Robert F. Cook & Stanley H. Pollock,
Bank Directors: Understanding Their Role, Responsibility and Liability, 40 MERCER L.
REV. 587, 596 (1989); John C. Deal, Liability of Bank Directors, 39 Bus. LAW. 1033, 1038
(1984); Matthew G. Dord, Presumed Innocent? Financial Institutions, Professional Mal-
practice Claims, and Defenses Based on Management Misconduct, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 127, 180, 183-84; Richard B. Dyson, The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40 IND.
L.J. 341, 343-44, 354 (1965); Jorge A. Gutierrez, Lender, Director, and Officer Liability, 49
TEX. BAR J. 700, 700-01 (1986); Paul H. Irving & T. Hale Boggs, Financial Institution
Directors: Mitigating Risks of Liability in Shareholder Actions, 109 BANKING L.J. 336, 343-
44 (1992); Ira S. Newman, Reducing the Risk of Bank Director Liability, 96 BANKING L.J.
418, 419-20 (1979); Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Modeb A Direc-
tor's Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1360 n.22, 1377-78 (1989); Peter G.
Weinstock, Directors and Officers of Failing Banks: Pitfalls and Precautions, 106 BANKING
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relegated banking to the backwater, scholars thus have failed to grasp the
vast extent to which courts have second-guessed decisions of bank direc-
tors on the merits in negligence cases for the past hundred years. More
importantly, this oversight has made scholars blind to the insights that
this rich experience affords into assumptions about the business judgment
rule.
The most important assumption is that substantive judicial regulation
of corporate decisions would inject too much risk aversion into the board-
room. A sister assumption is that courts, if they regulate board conduct
at all, normally impose monitoring duties in lieu of substantive regula-
tion. Commentators also assume that to the limited extent courts override
the business judgment rule, they do so solely with respect to extraordi-
nary corporate decisions such as mergers, asset sales, and other potential
changes in management control.2 All three of these assumptions have
taken on a life of their own, notwithstanding the recent revamping of the
L.J. 434, 445-47 (1989); Hugh Farrell Sharber, Comment, A Realistic Duty of Care for
Outside Bank Directors, 51 TENN. L. REV. 569, 589 (1984). For articles discussing breaches
in the business judgment rule in banking, see Robert A. Eberle & Kevin R. Genirs, When
Change Meets Tradition: The Paradox of Thrift Director Liability, 1987 ANN. REV. BANK-
ING L. 413, 441; Heidi M. Schooner, Fiduciary Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank Director
Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 186
(1995); Ronald W. Stevens & Bruce H. Nielson, The Standard of Care for Directors and
Officers of Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It's Gross Negligence Regardless of
Whether Section 1821(k) Preempts Federal Common Law, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 169,
184 (1994); David B. Fischer, Comment, Bank Director Liability Under FIRREA: A New
Defense for Directors and Officers of Insolvent Depository Institutions - Or a Tighter
Noose?, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1718-19 (1992); Mark D. Wallace, Comment, Life in the
Boardroom After FIRREA: A Revisionist Approach to Corporate Governance in Insured
Depository Institutions, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1187, 1274 (1992); FDIC and RTC Challenge
BBLN Tally of PL Cases, Claim Winning Records on Merits, 5 BANK BAILOUT LITIG.
NEWS 1, 3-4 (Oct. 26, 1994).
2. See WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OF-
FICERS AND DIRECTORS 182, 196-98 (4th ed. 1988); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Direc-
tor's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business
Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 596-97 (1983); Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of
Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAW. 461,472-73 (1992); Bayless Manning, Reflections and
Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 5-6 (1985); E.
Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act,
The Trans Union Case, and the ALl Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1483,
1484, 1486 (1985). See generally Dennis J. Block et al., Chancellor Allen, The Business
Judgment Rule, and the Shareholders' Right to Decide, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 785 (1992);
Stephen A. Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 707 (1988).
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American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance,3 due to a
lack of any systematic analysis of case outcomes in specific industries.4
When this analysis is performed in banking, each of these assumptions
proves incorrect. For over a century courts have scrutinized a wide array
of substantive bank decisions for negligence out of concern for undue risk
to depositors and deposit insurance funds.5 In fact, courts regulated sub-
stantive bank director decisions through the common law decades before
they began to peruse bank decisions for procedural flaws. Further, very
few banking decisions can be characterized as "extraordinary" in the
sense of involving contests for corporate control.6 Rather, the cases
which have received the greatest judicial scrutiny over the past century
focus almost exclusively on day-to-day decisions, particularly decisions on
lending.7
Most significant, however, is what the banking industry's experience
says about avoiding risk aversion, the classic justification for the business
judgment rule. As the thrift and bank crisis of the 1980s showed, far from
inducing undue caution in the banking system, the judiciary's stabs at
common law regulation were ineffective in halting losses from imprudent
3. 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALY-
SIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 4.01(a), (c) (1992).
4. See Gregory A. Mark, Some Observations on Writing the Legal History of the Cor-
poration in the Age of Theory, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 67, 75-77 (Lawrence
Mitchell ed., 1995). Professor Phillips has aptly pointed out the need for such analysis:
"[T]he 'law' of duty of care is highly fact-dependent. The 'law' really consists of how
courts generally react to similar materializations of risk, notwithstanding the apparent so-
lidification of that judicial reaction as doctrine in some corporate statutes." David Phillips,
Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653,
658 (1984); accord Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1211 (1990); cf. RTC v. Cityfed Fin. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1236 n.6
(3d Cir. 1995) (noting "the fact-intensive nature" of bank director negligence law).
5. For an analysis of the economic and political forces that triggered substantive regu-
lation of banking by the judiciary and whether those forces make banking "special," see
Patricia A. McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judgment Rule in Banking: Impli-
cations for Corporate Governance (manuscript on file with author).
6. The paucity of court cases challenging bank mergers and changes in management
control is not surprising. Hostile takeovers in banking have been rare and friendly mergers
have tended to play out in the regulatory arena due to the need for statutorily-mandated
regulatory approvals. See HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANK REGULATION FAILED: DESIGN-
ING A BANK REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s 58,86-88 (1991). With the growth of
interstate banking, however, there has been a recent upswing in hostile bank merger bids.
See Saul Hansell, Wave of Mergers is Transforming American Banking, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
21, 1995, at Al.
7. The focus on lending is explained by the fact that until recently, "the effect of
regulatory control was to confine the banking industry to the deposit-lending business."
GARTEN, supra note 6, at 39.
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thrift and bank decisions.' Whatever can be said about this latest bank-
ing debacle, undue risk aversion was not a problem. Thus, when viewed
against the backdrop of the judiciary's long involvement in substantive
bank regulation, last decade's events raise interesting questions about the
risk aversion rationale.
To begin, the lengthy experience with judicial regulation of the banking
industry suggests that over the long run, substantive common law rules
will fall into disuse unless they are adopted by courts in a substantial
number of states.9 In turn, many states will not replicate such rules ex-
cept in rare instances where industry practice or bank system catastro-
phes create support for the rules. Moreover, even where support exists,
the judiciary's aversion to financial analysis will hamstring the regulatory
techniques at its disposal.
Thus, while the short-term effect may be to induce undue risk aversion
on a local basis, there is little evidence that substantive judicial regulation
of the banking industry induces undue risk aversion in the long run. The
common law frailties that caused judicial attempts at regulation to break
down - particularly the "race to the bottom" - are common to all in-
dustries. In this respect, the banking experience cuts across industry lines
and suggests that long-term concerns about undue risk aversion are
overblown.
Consequently, the past century's experience in the banking industry
presents a valuable case study of the effects of substantive regulation of
board decisions through the common law.' ° The results of that experi-
ence help provide answers to several questions. First, to what extent does
the business judgment rule remain alive in the banking industry and why?
Second, what regulatory techniques have courts used or avoided and
8. Total losses from the 1980s bank and thrift crisis have been estimated at anywhere
from $175 billion to $500 billion. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER,
BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 35 (1992); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL INSTI-
TUTION REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DE-
BACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 4 (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION].
9. The current judicial backlash against last decade's cases overriding the business
judgment rule with respect to bank directors is simply the latest swing in this historic cycle.
See infra notes 182, 185, 187. In 1993 and 1994, seven federal district courts reportedly
denied negligence recovery against financial institution directors on business judgment rule
grounds. See FDIC and RTC Challenge BBLN Tally Of PL Cases, Claim Winning Records
on Merits, supra note 1, at 1, 5-7. Most of those decisions are unreported. See id. Recent
court decisions ruling against plaintiffs in many bank director liability cases on collateral
issues such as the statute of limitations and insurance policy exclusions also provide evi-
dence of this cycle. See id. at 3.
10. This article uses the terms "judicial regulation" and "common-law regulation" in-
terchangeably to refer to judicial oversight of bank board decisions through judge-made
negligence rules that do not adopt codified standards as the duty of care.
1034 [Vol. 44:1031
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why? Third, which of these techniques succeeded and which failed?
Fourth, what explains the respective successes and failures? Fifth, what
happens when judicial regulation fails? Sixth, to what extent is the bank-
ing experience instructive with respect to other industries? And seventh,
what does this experience teach about the avoidance of risk aversion ra-
tionale? This article seeks to address these questions in the course of
examining the evolution of the business judgment rule in the banking
industry."'
I. DOCTRINAL FORMULATIONS
In suits against corporate directors for negligence, the duty of care
proscribes substantive decisions that the fabled "ordinarily prudent" di-
rector would not have made. The classic statement to this effect appears
in the 1891 banking case of Briggs v. Spaulding,2 where the United
States Supreme Court defined the duty of care as the care "which ordina-
rily prudent and diligent men would exercise under similar circum-
stances," taking into account "the restrictions of the statute and the
usages of business."' 3 The duty of care thus implies that board decisions
will be penalized if they are stacked up against the fact-finder's concep-
tions of objective prudence or industry practice and found wanting.
11. This article discusses the business judgment rule as it applies to banks, savings and
loan institutions, credit unions, trust companies, mutual savings banks, and the like. Where
appropriate, the word "bank" will be used to designate all such financial institutions, re-
gardless of their type.
12. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
13. Id. at 152; see id. at 171 (Harlan, J., dissenting); accord, e.g., Michelsen v. Penney,
135 F.2d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 1943); RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1366-67 (D. Utah 1993);
FDIC v. Stanley, 770 F. Supp. 1281, 1310 (N.D. Ind. 1991), aff'd sub nom. FDIC v. Bier-
man, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993); Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Wilhite, 233 S.W. 710, 712
(Ark. 1921); Delano v. Case, 12 N.E. 676, 676 (Ill. 1887); Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown,
171 N.E. 42, 44 (Mass. 1930); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940);
see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 34
CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 323, 328 (Robert B. Thompson ed., 1992-1993).
The cases formulate the "ordinary prudence" standard in different ways. See generally
Marcia M. McMurray et al., Special Project, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care,
the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 607-08 (1987).
Some cases require the care that an ordinarily prudent person would take in his or her own
business affairs. See Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (N.Y. 1880); Marshall v. Farmers' &
Mechanics' Sav. Bank, 8 S.E. 586, 590 (Va. 1889). Others, such as Briggs, require directors
to exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent person in similar circumstances, i.e., that of an
ordinarily prudent director. See Briggs, 141 U.S. at 152; Neese v. Brown, 405 S.W.2d 577,
581 (Tenn. 1964). Today, a majority of states has passed statutes codifying the Briggs "pru-
dent director" standard. See McMurray, supra at 608 & n.15 (citing statutes); see also 1
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, § 4.01(a); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 8.30 (1984).
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The business judgment rule seeks to temper concerns that the duty of
care will make directors unduly risk-averse by immunizing many of the
substantive board decisions that the duty of care might otherwise pro-
scribe.1 4 Under the business judgment rule, disinterested board deci-
sions, based on calculated risks that turn out wrong, are exempt from
liability for negligence.' 5 In order to qualify for business judgment rule
protection, the disputed decision must have satisfied the duty of loyalty 6
and complied with applicable laws, corporate charters, and by-laws.1
7
Assuming those prerequisites are met, the business judgment rule shields
honest but arguably imprudent board decisions from negligence liability.
That said, it begs the question to assume that the business judgment
rule applies with full force in every industry and every case. The true
reach of the business judgment rule in any industry cannot be determined
until the decisions that do and do not merit latitude have been ascer-
tained. When that analysis is performed for the banking industry, it is
evident that courts have nullified the business judgment rule with respect
to a surprisingly wide range of bank lending practices.
II. SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW REGULATION
One of the fastest-held beliefs about the business judgment rule is that
substantive board outcomes are not regulated by common law negligence
14. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983); Muller v. Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 275 S.W. 750, 752 (Ark. 1925); Eisenberg,
supra note 13, at 343-44.
15. Cary, 82 N.Y. at 70; see also, e.g., FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 131 n.13 (5th Cir.
1992); Joy, 692 F.2d at 885; Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Sav. Bank, 75 F. 781, 783-85,
787-89 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896); Wynn v. Tallapoosa County Bank, 53 So. 228, 239 (Ala. 1910);
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 727 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 24
(Pa. 1872).
Recent banking cases have clashed over whether the business judgment rule is a defense
or an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. Compare, e.g., RTC v. Heiserman, 839 F.
Supp. 1457, 1463 (D. Colo. 1993) (the business judgment rule "is an affirmative defense to
an ordinary negligence claim") with FDIC v. Brown, 812 F. Supp. 722, 724 (S.D. Tex. 1992)
(the rule "is not merely a defense" but "is a rule of substantive law" that imposes affirma-
tive burdens of pleading and proof on plaintiffs).
16. See, e.g., Wheat, 970 F.2d at 128-30 (discussing the duty owed by bank directors);
Joy, 692 F.2d at 886; Washington Bancorp. v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1269 (D.D.C. 1993);
AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Wheeler, 75 F. at 785;
Pocomoke City Nat'l Bank v. Crockett, 125 A. 712, 715 (Md. 1924); Spering's Appeal, 71
Pa. at 20, 24; Dooley, supra note 2, at 486-87.
17. Briggs, 141 U.S. at 146. But see FDIC v. Benson, 867 F. Supp. 512, 522 (S.D. Tex.
1994) (granting summary judgment for directors on grounds that illegal or ultra vires acts
do not constitute negligence); Warren v. Robison, 57 P. 287, 291 (Utah 1899) (stating: "[i]f,
however, directors, acting in good faith, and with reasonable care, skill, and diligence, nev-
ertheless fall into a mistake, either of law or fact, they will not be liable for the conse-
quences of such mistake").
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rules, save in instances of rank "irrationality." At least in the banking
industry, the cases belie that analysis. In banking, the judiciary has regu-
lated a variety of substantive bank practices through negligence law for
over a century. In doing so, courts have experimented with a range of
regulatory techniques. Their decisions provide a wealth of data on the
success of those techniques and their effect on boardroom conduct.
A. Minimum Rationality: Lack of Profit Potential
The one aspect of judicial substantive bank regulation that the corpo-
rate law literature has probed consists of a handful of cases, notably Hun
v. Cary18 and Litwin v. Allen,19 that struck down bank decisions for lack
of "minimum rationality."2 These cases earned the sobriquet "minimum
rationality" because they sought to stamp out transactions that were pa-
tently irrational from the bank's or depositors' point of view: i.e., transac-
tions with no apparent profit potential on their face.
The "profit potential" standard had a certain appeal, which some be-
lieved was the implicit promise of a safe harbor. Many assumed that
boards approving transactions with no profit potential could expect sub-
stantive judicial scrutiny, while boards approving transactions with at
least some profit potential could safely expect none. But when this dis-
tinction proved too difficult to administer in banking, substantive judicial
regulation expanded to embrace potentially profitable bank decisions as
well.
The earliest minimum rationality case was Hun v. Cary,21 where the
directors of a savings bank on the brink of insolvency voted to build an
imposing new headquarters with depositor funds. Condemning that deci-
sion as "a case of improvidence, of reckless, unreasonable extravagance,"
the court held the directors liable.22 Essentially, Hun was a classic in-
stance of waste. The headquarters' stated justification - to attract new
depositors - made no economic sense if the bank doors were about to
shut. Obviously, there could be no profit potential in so extravagant a
capital expenditure when the institution was on the verge of financial col-
lapse.23 That being the case, Hun made potential profitability a minimum
requirement of a bank director's duty of care when approving
transactions.
18. 82 N.Y. 65 (N.Y. 1880).
19. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
20. See authors cited infra at note 34; Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 345-46.
21. 82 N.Y. 65 (N.Y. 1880).
22. Id. at 78-79.
23. See Dooley, supra note 2, at 480 n.60; Dyson, supra note 1, at 370.
1995] 1037
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Litwin v. Allen,24 decided sixty years after Hun, established the same
proposition on considerably more ambiguous facts. In Litwin, the direc-
tors of Guaranty Trust25 voted to buy Missouri Pacific 51/2% subordinated
debentures from Missouri Pacific's parent company, Alleghany Corpora-
tion.26 Because the debentures were convertible to stock, Alleghany
feared losing control of Missouri Pacific to Guaranty Trust.2 7 Conse-
quently, Alleghany insisted on an option to repurchase the debentures -
a "call" - at the original sales price within six months. Guaranty Trust
agreed to the call but failed to obtain a corresponding "put": an option to
resell the debentures to the issuer at a favorable preset price if the price
of the debentures fell.28 Afterwards, the debentures dropped in value,
Alleghany declined to exercise its call, and Guaranty Trust's shareholders
sued its directors.29
The Litwin court condemned the call transaction as negligent because,
during the six-month life of the option, Guaranty Trust bore the risk of
capital loss with no prospect for capital gain.3" Calling banking "a busi-
ness affected with a public interest,",31 the court ruled that the directors
had a responsibility to invest depositors' and shareholders' funds in vehi-
cles with at least the potential for profit.32 Not to do so, the court im-
plied, would violate the legitimate expectations of depositors and
investors who had entrusted their funds to the bank.33 Thus, Litwin
seconded the proposition that where a bank transaction has no discerni-
ble profit potential, it is economically irrational and thus impermissible.
In the half century since Litwin, its soundness on the facts has been
rightly challenged.34  True, the directors signed away the right to poten-
24. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
25. Historically, New York trust companies such as Guaranty Trust have been regu-
lated under New York banking laws. See N.Y. BANKING LAW art. I, § 2 (Consol. 1994) and
legislative history; id. arts. III, III-B.
26. See 25 N.Y.S.2d at 692-93 (noting the contents of the purchase letter).
27. Id. at 692.
28. See id. at 694-95 (discussing the details of the debenture transaction).
29. See id. at 676, 691-92 (commenting on the drop in value and the subsequent
lawsuit).
30. Id. at 697-98; see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing the risk
of loss with no upside potential for gain), cert. denied sub norn. Citytrust v. Joy, 460 U.S.
1051 (1983).
31. Litwin, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
32. Id. at 699 (holding that directors will be liable for transactions that are "so improv-
ident, so risky, so unusual and unnecessary as to be contrary to fundamental conceptions of
prudent banking practice").
33. See id. at 697 (discussing the public trust people have in banks).
34. See Bishop, supra note 1, at 1098; Dooley, supra note 2, at 480 n.60; Dyson, supra
note 1, at 370; Palmiter, supra note 1, at 1380-81; David M. Phillips, Managerial Misuse of
Property: The Synthesizing Thread In Corporate Doctrine, 32 RUrGERS L. REV. 184, 206
1038 [Vol. 44:1031
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tial market appreciation for six months while retaining the risk of loss.
But the matter did not end there. Even without a put, the transaction
might have been potentially profitable if the directors had bargained for
some other consideration, such as higher interest or a collateral financial
benefit.35 And in fact, they did: after all, Guaranty Trust was entitled to
51/% interest.36 Whether the Litwin court failed to grasp this fact 37 or
purposely imposed a stiffer duty of care out of conflict-of-interest con-
cems38 remains unclear.
These uncertainties are testament to the fact that it is no easy thing to
pinpoint lack of profit potential from the bench, even with the benefit of
hindsight. For this reason, later courts shied away from this type of finan-
cial analysis in banking cases, leaving Hun and Litwin in splendid isola-
tion. One sign of the "minimum rationality" doctrine's demise is the fact
that another class of bank transactions with no direct profit potential -
interest-free check overdrafts to outside customers - almost never is pe-
nalized by the bench.39 Arguably, such overdrafts flunk a potential prof-
itability test because they are loans without interest or formal terms for
repayment. Nonetheless, most courts have treated disinterested over-
drafts leniently, preferring to view them as a low-risk, "tied" product that
could attract a potentially profitable upswing in deposits.4" The fact that
(1979); Larry D. Soderquist, The Proper Standard For Directors' Negligence Liability, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 37, 38-39, 45-46 (1990).
35. See Soderquist, supra note 34, at 38, 45-46.
36. See Dooley, supra note 2, at 480 n.60.
37. See Soderquist, supra note 34, at 39.
38. See Bishop, supra note 1, at 1098; Dyson, supra note 1, at 370; Palmiter, supra note
1, at 1380-81; Phillips, supra note 34, at 206-07. Those concerns inhered in the fact that the
buyback arrangements served other financial interests of Guaranty Trust's affiliates. Guar-
anty Trust was a bank affiliate of J.P. Morgan & Company, while Alleghany was the princi-
pal holding company for the tottering Van Sweringen railroad system. Phillips, supra note
34, at 206. J.P. Morgan & Company had invested heavily in the Van Sweringen businesses
and obviously had an interest in preserving its investment by staving off the financial col-
lapse of the Van Sweringen empire. See id. at 206-07; Palmiter, supra note 1, at 1380.
39. See, e.g., Wynn v. Tallapoosa County Bank, 53 So. 228, 240 (Ala. 1910) (recogniz-
ing a "uniform and long-continued acquiescence of the officers and committees of a bank"
in allowing cashiers to act alone in allowing check overdrafts).
40. See id. at 239; Scott's Ex'rs v. Young, 21 S.W.2d 994, 998 (Ky. 1929); Pryse v. Farm-
ers' Bank, 33 S.W. 532, 533 (Ky. 1895); Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 839 (N.J. Ch. 1889);
Wallace v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 15 S.W. 448, 454-55 (Tenn. 1891). But see Campbell v. Wat-
son, 50 A. 120, 142 (N.J. Ch. 1901) (refusing to apply the business judgment rule to shelter
the approval of worthless loans that were meant to cover a bank president's sizable over-
drafts and that obviously involved self-dealing).
Check overdrafts are one of the few lending topics that federal regulators (with the nota-
ble exception of the Office of Thrift Supervision) have declined to supervise except insofar
as such overdrafts violate restrictions on loans to one borrower and insider loans. The
Office of Thrift Supervision specifically permits check account overdrafts up to stated ag-
gregate limits per thrift. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.46-545.47 (1995). For restrictions on check
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courts do not even ask if overdrafts are potentially profitable shows how
moribund the "minimum rationality" test has become.
But it would be a mistake to assume from this state of affairs that
courts abandoned substantive regulation of the banking industry alto-
gether when the potential profitability test proved unworkable. To the
contrary, other bank cases, some of which were decided around the time
of Litwin and Hun, used even more intrusive means of judicial review.
They did so by condemning bank practices that were potentially profita-
ble but nonetheless were deemed by courts to be unduly risky.41 In cer-
tain cases, these holdings took the form of activity bans. Other cases
declined to ban activities but required risky activities to incorporate risk
management safeguards.
This development had two significant consequences. It destroyed the
business judgment rule as a screening device that protects a class of bank
transactions from review - those that are disinterested and potentially
profitable - because even potentially profitable transactions are now
subject to scrutiny. At the same time, the judiciary's inherent difficulties
in assessing risk, designing safeguards, and enforcing those safeguards na-
tionwide eventually resulted in increased federal codification of bank
loan standards. The fate of judicial bans on discrete bank activities is an
important example of this development.
B. Common Law Activity Bans
In the main, American courts have been reluctant to outlaw entire lines
of bank business. Some courts did so, however, where they perceived the
risk of loss from certain potentially profitable activities, such as securities
underwriting and construction loans, as unduly high.
This approach paralleled the prudent man rule in trust law which pos-
tulated that safe - and conversely unsafe - investments existed and
could be identified.42 But as modern portfolio theory points out, the
problem with this approach is that as risk declines, so do average re-
overdraft privileges for insiders and loans to one borrower, see 12 U.S.C. § 375b(6) (1994);
12 C.F.R. §§ 32.105, 215.3-215.5 & app. (1995). The new FDIC audit guidelines recom-
mend that check overdrafts by insiders be disclosed. 12 C.F.R. pt. 363, app. A (1995).
Thus, federal policy on this subject continues to mirror the traditional attitude of the judici-
ary, which regarded interest-free overdrafts to outside customers as a low-risk necessity of
business. Alternatively, the treatment of check overdrafts can be viewed as a type of de
minimis rule.
41. Conversely, courts condone check overdrafts even though they do not directly gen-
erate profit because overdrafts are considered low-risk and valuable in attracting other,
profitable business. See supra note 40.
42. See BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRU-
DENT MAN RULE 74 (1986).
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turns.43 Consequently, activity bans have the effect of either artificially
limiting revenues or pushing banks into other equally risky activities that
may be less familiar to regulators. Additionally, activity bans are nearly
impossible to sustain over any appreciable period of time because compa-
nies outside of banking - and banks in states that do not observe the
bans - exploit their freedom from such bans to gain competitive advan-
tage. For these reasons, common law attempts to impose activity bans
have largely failed.
1. Securities Underwriting
Prohibitions against securities underwriting are the most obvious ex-
ample of bank activity bans. At the federal level, such bans historically
have been imposed by statute and have their origins in the National
Banking Act of 1864. The first state forays in this area, in contrast, were
initiated by the bench. The fate of state common law regulation in this
area provides valuable insights into the difficulties of risk management by
the judiciary.
The National Banking Act of 186444 formed the backdrop for subse-
quent state court activity in the area of securities underwriting by banks.
In 1897, the Supreme Court, in California Bank v. Kennedy,45 held that
the National Banking Act barred national banks from stock ownership
and thus from firm-commitment underwriting.4 6 Until the 1933 passage
of the Glass-Steagall Act, however, this ban did not apply to state-
chartered banks. Thus, before Glass-Steagall, securities underwriting by
state-chartered banks and thrifts was left to the aegis of the states.
Before 1933, state courts made no significant attempt to interfere with
securities underwriting activities by banks, with the single exception of
New York. In 1909, in Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co.," the New
43. See id. at 82-84. As Longstreth points out: "Viewed in isolation, raw land or com-
modity futures are highly suspect as unproductive assets under the constrained rule. Con-
sidered as part of a portfolio designed to hedge against inflation, these investments can
well be justified by historical data showing their sensitivity to rising price levels." Id. at 84;
see id. at 121-25; see also II MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 7.2,
at 7.11 (1995) (discussing American model viewing investment banking "as a risky, specu-
lative venture and consequently as an inappropriate activity for an institution devoted to
the care of deposits from the public").
44. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 101 (1864) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994)).
45. 167 U.S. 362 (1897).,
46. Id. at 366-67 (discussing the National Banking Act and the limits it places on
banks buying stock in industrial corporations). National banks could conduct underwriting
activities through their securities affiliates. Id.; see also II MALLOY, supra note 43, § 7.2, at
7.13-7.19 (commenting on the events leading up to the National Banking Act's restrictions
on securities dealing by banks).
47. 89 N.E. 476 (N.Y. 1909).
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York Court of Appeals forbade trust companies from underwriting stock
offerings because it considered securities underwriting overly hazardous:
"[A trust company's] authority to buy and sell stocks and bonds does not
authorize it to indulge in hazardous promoting schemes, although it may
hope from the successful launching of such schemes to make large com-
missions and receive large bonuses. '48 In the judgment of the court, an
undeniably high profit potential did not justify securities underwriting
due to an equally high potential for loss. 49 Thus, Gause instituted a judi-
cially-crafted activity ban designed to advance capital preservation at the
expense of potential profit maximization.
Other states chose to ignore Gause, however, and continued to permit
their state-chartered institutions to engage in securities activities. In tan-
dem with the National Banking Act's securities restrictions on national
banks, the effect was to increase the competitive advantage of state-
chartered institutions in states with less stringent standards.5" Thus,
rather than following the lead of the National Banking Act and Gause,
sister states retained their more liberal regulatory regimes in order to
confer a competitive advantage on their home institutions.
That political calculus did not change until the onset of the Great De-
pression. After concluding that bank underwriting activities had helped
to trigger the worst string of bank failures in the nation's history, Con-
gress, in the Glass-Steagall Act, mandated a firewall between commercial
banking and securities underwriting.51 Significantly, Congress applied
parts of that firewall both to national banks and their state-chartered
counterparts.52
48. Id. at 483; see also id. at 482 (discussing cases that support this proposition);
Davidge v. Guardian Trust Co., 96 N.E. 751, 754 (N.Y. 1911) (stating that trust companies
cannot "become the guarantor of the indebtedness or business of others"); Jemison v.
Citizens' Sav. Bank, 25 N.E. 264, 265 (N.Y. 1890) (noting that "[s]peculative contracts en-
tered into for the sale or purchase of stock by a savings bank.. . , subject to the hazard and
contingency of gain or loss, are ultra vires"); Sistare v. Best, 88 N.Y. 527, 533 (N.Y. 1882)
(same). But see O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co., 289 N.Y.S. 252, 270-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1936) (while normally a "bank may not engage in the guaranty business," it may join a
consortium of other banks guaranteeing deposits if necessary to avoid a domino effect if
another member bank fails), aff'd, I N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937), aff'd,16 N.E.2d
302 (N.Y. 1938).
49. Gause, 89 N.E. at 483 (discussing the permissibility of hazardous transactions).
50. See II MALLOY, supra note 43, § 7.2, at 7.12-7.13.
51. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933); see II MALLOY, supra
note 43, § 7.2, at 7.2.1 (outlining the legislative history and socioeconomic factors leading
to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act).
52. See II MALLOY, supra note 43, 88 7.2-7.2.1, at 7.6-7.30. That firewall consists of
four prohibitions. Sections 5(c), 16, and 21(a)(1) prohibit national banks and state-
chartered financial institutions from underwriting corporate securities or otherwise dealing
in them for their own accounts. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 335, 378(a)(1) (1994); see also
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Glass-Steagall is an important early example of federal codified stan-
dards supplanting the business judgment rule in banking. As such, Glass-
Steagall presaged two important conceptual shifts in bank regulation.
First, Glass-Steagall foreshadowed the massive transfer of bank oversight
from the states to the federal government that was achieved by passage of
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act 53
(hereinafter "FIRREA") and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act 54 (hereinafter "FDICIA"). Second, Glass-Steagall
transformed the source of applicable law from common law rules with
limited geographical effect to federal code-based standards having na-
tionwide applicability, a trend that has accelerated in recent years.
Both changes were designed to overcome the inherent inability of
courts - both state and federal - to enforce common law restrictions on
bank activities outside their jurisdictions. The period before Glass-Stea-
gall showed that where restrictions have less than comprehensive binding
effect, neighboring states will decline to adopt similar restrictions in order
to gain competitive advantage. Hence, with relatively few exceptions, ef-
forts to supplant the business judgment rule in banking with affirmative
legal limits on board conduct have evolved toward federal, code-based
standards.
Glass-Steagall is doubly instructive as an example of the limited shelf
life of activity bans. Although Glass-Steagall is still on the books, its
practical force has been sapped over time as federal courts and agencies
have relaxed its provisions through repeated reinterpretation. The cumu-
lative effect of these rulings has been to permit bank affiliates (and in
some cases banks themselves) to act as discount brokers, place commer-
§ 355; II MALLOY, supra note 43, § 7.2.1, at 7.29-7.32. Section 20 prohibits member banks
of the Federal Reserve from affiliating with investment banks, defined as any entity "en-
gaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution . . . of
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities .... " 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994). Section
21 bars anyone who distributes or underwrites corporate securities from accepting depos-
its. § 378(a)(1). Finally, Section 32 prohibits management interlocks among member
banks and officers, directors, and employees of securities firms. § 78. Professor Mark Roe
attributes Glass-Steagall's resort to bans in part to anti-Wall Street political sentiment:
[I]t's at least plausible that those who aspired to control financial abuses could
have used other means, such as disclosure, case-by-case attack, and prohibition of
dangerous transactions between the intermediary and the firm, instead of a ban
on large ownership itself. Given the anti-finance rhetoric, it's plausible that part
of the reason well-meaning regulators often opted for across-the-board bans went
beyond the severity of the financial abuses, but depended on the political rhetoric
they heard in the background.
MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERI-
CAN CORPORATE FINANCE 38 (1994).
53. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
54. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
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cial paper, arrange private placements, market mutual funds, and engage
in certain underwriting activities.55
These rulings are a direct response to the success of brokerage houses
and mutual funds in siphoning off bank deposits since the 1970s.56 At its
inception, Glass-Steagall proceeded on the assumption that banks did not
have to compete with Wall Street because Wall Street would not compete
for the retail deposits of banks. But in the 1970s, Wall Street dashed that
premise by luring depositors away with money market accounts offering
double-digit returns. As the deposit bases of financial institutions shrank,
it became clear that Congress could not insulate banks from competition
by the securities industry through the expedient of artificial, statutory
firewalls.5 7 Nor could banks be exposed to competition from the securi-
ties industry without being able to market securities products themselves.
The result, therefore, has been a gradual loosening of Glass-Steagall's
strictures.
As Glass-Steagall shows, it is not enough to regulate through codified,
national standards. The choice of regulatory techniques is also key. For
the reasons just discussed, activity bans are especially prone to succumb
to market forces and thus are disfavored by most courts.
2. Loans To New Business Ventures
Glass-Steagall consciously was designed to take American banks out of
the securities industry and make lending their principal business. 58 Yet
even in the domain of lending, a few courts experimented with activity
bans where they deemed the risks of specific types of lending unduly
high. A prime example consists of loans to start-up ventures.
New business loans present undeniably high levels of risk, at least inso-
far as repayment depends on operating revenues. For this reason, courts
have split over the propriety of loans to start-up ventures, both recently
and in the past. This split reflects conflicting philosophies as to appropri-
ate judicial techniques for managing the inherent risk in new business
loans.
55. See GARTEN, supra note 6, at 2, 5-6, 65; II MALLOY, supra note 43, §§ 7.2.2-7.2.4,
7.3.4-7.3.7; see also Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 10, 17-18 (1991).
56. Cf. Securities Ind. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S.
207, 214-21 (1984) (ruling that the acquisition by Bank of America of Schwab, a securities
brokerage, did not violate Glass-Steagall in part because securities brokerages had ex-
panded into areas traditionally served by banking institutions).
57. See GARTEN, supra note 6, at 8-14.
58. See id. at 10, 39.
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Some courts flatly condemned such loans as negligent, based on the
view that an outright ban is the only effective way to avoid undue risk. In
the 1918 case of Magale v. Fomby,5 9 for example, shareholders sued bank
directors for loans made to a new cannery that never showed a profit.60
According to the Arkansas Supreme Court, the loans were negligent,
notwithstanding the directors' belief that "the business would be success-
ful."' 6 1 Specifically, the court stated:
It is not shown, however, that any of... [the directors] had had
any experience in operating a canning factory. It turned out to
be a hazardous business, and one that requires skill and experi-
ence on the part of those managing it in order to make it a suc-
cess. . . . The directors loaned large sums of money to an
enterprise which depended entirely upon its profits for a repay-
ment of the loan.6'
More recently, in the 1989 case of FDIC v. Robertson ,63 bank directors
were held liable for loans to three new businesses that had "no proven
track record of success."'
Conversely, other courts have refused to prohibit loans to new busi-
nesses for fear of stifling economic growth. In FDIC v. Stanley,65 for in-
stance, the court relieved bank directors of liability for uncollectible loans
to new farms and commercial businesses. 66 According to the court, the
fact that the borrower's business was new and had not turned a profit did
not form grounds for liability as long as the loan was adequately secured
and the borrower's financial indicators were improving.67 Thus, Stanley
repudiated a flat ban on bank loans to start-up ventures in favor of risk
management through traditional techniques such as collateralization.
59. 201 S.W. 278 (Ark. 1918).
60. Id. at 278-79.
61. Id. at 280.
62. Id. The court undoubtedly was influenced by the fact that the cannery loans con-
sumed nearly 60% of the bank's capital. Id. Nevertheless, the court affirmed dismissal of
the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 281; see also Cosmopolitan
Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 136 N.E. 403, 409 (Mass. 1922) (holding bank loans to "persons with-
out credit, without business reputation and without financial resources ... highly impru-
dent"); cf Williams v. Fidelity Loan & Sav. Co., 128 S.E. 615, 622 (Va. 1925) (directors'
decision to expand into consumer automobile loans immediately after World War I would
have been negligent if the company had been a bank and depositors' funds had been at
risk).
63. No. 87-2623-S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292 (D. Kan. July 24, 1989).
64. Id. at *6-*7, *9-*10, *17, *19-*20 (discussing the bank loans to these three un-
proven businesses).
65. 770 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ind. 1991), aff'd sub nom. FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424
(7th Cir. 1993).
66. Id. at 1294-95, 1299-1305.
67. Id.
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In 1992, federal bank regulators adopted final guidelines on real estate
loans that track the Stanley court's approach and appear to permit loans
to new developers so long as there are adequate independent assurances
of repayment, such as personal guarantees and sufficient collateral. 68 The
Clinton Administration's interagency policy statement on credit availabil-
ity for small- and medium-sized businesses goes one step further and ac-
tively encourages loans to new businesses that can provide objective
assurances of repayment.69
Like an outright ban, the Stanley approach cuts back on the business
judgment rule but does so with a scalpel rather than a cleaver. Bans like
those in Magale and Robertson gave no credence to the social utility of
new business financing. Stanley, in contrast, recognized that such loans
may have significant potential benefits in the form of new jobs, innova-
tive products, added bank revenue, and the like, and sought to achieve
those benefits through risk management.
As the early 1990s "credit crunch" debate shows, where the potential
benefits of an activity are sufficiently high, market demand and pressure
from the banking industry will erode bans on those activities. It is nearly
impossible for courts to enforce activity bans against banks under those
circumstances in the long run. Thus, the modern tack has been to permit
risky but potentially beneficial loans subject to strict underwriting
guidelines.
3." Land Development Loans
A handful of state courts also experimented with activity bans on loans
for the acquisition and development of land by commercial developers
(sometimes known as acquisition, development, and construction or
"ADC" loans). The abject failure of such bans became abundantly clear
by the 1980s.
At the federal level, commercial real estate loans by national banks
have long been subject to regulation under the National Banking Act.7 °
Until 1992, however, federal law did not directly regulate similar activi-
68. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A;
id. pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A.
69. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., INTERAGENCY POL-
ICY STATEMENT ON CREDIT AVAILABILITY (Mar. 10, 1993); OCC Tells National Banks 3-
Rated Banks Can Join Low Documentation Program, 61 Banking Rep. (BNA), at 321
(Aug. 30, 1993).
70. Real estate loans by national banks historically have been subject to loan-to-value
requirements, which sometimes were as strict as 50%. See 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994);- 12
U.S.C.A. § 371(a), Historical and Statutory Notes, at 183-88 (1994); EUGENE NELSON
WHITE, THE REGULATION AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM, 1900-1929,
23 (1983).
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ties by state-chartered banks, except for loans that implicated restrictions
on loans to insiders and single borrowers.7' In the breach, a handful of
older state cases specifically addressed the legality of loans by state-
chartered banks to commercial developers for the acquisition and devel-
opment of raw land.
Commercial real estate loans were a major source of losses in the thrift
and bank crisis of the 1980s.72 But concerns about such loans are hardly
new. For example, in 1889 in Williams v. McKay,73 the New Jersey Chan-
cery Court condemned a loan to develop land as negligent where repay-
ment hinged on appreciation of the land.74 Two other cases also
addressed the repayment issue before the 1980s.75 All three cases re-
solved the issue by banning real estate loans that depended on future
land appreciation.76
71. See ROBERT E. BARNETT, RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIABILITIES OF BANK AND
BANK HOLDING COMPANY DIRECTORS 21-27, 45-46 (1991) (discussing restrictions on in-
sider loans); JAMES L. PIERCE, THE FUTURE OF BANKING 92-93 (1991). Congress insti-
tuted loan-to-value requirements for real estate loans by thrifts in 1978 but abolished those
provisions in the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464, History (app.), at
763-64, 774-76 (Lawyers Coop. 1992).
72. See Alliance Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 782 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir.) (af-
firming an agency order putting a thrift institution into receivership), modified on other
grounds, 790 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The court attributed its decision in part
to the fact that "more than 75% of [the thrift's].., loan portfolio involved major specula-
tive construction, land acquisition, and commercial real estate loans, many of which were
of substandard quality." Id. Alliance Federal catalogued the dangers inherent in many
commercial real estate loans made in the 1980s, including pressure to make large numbers
of substandard loans due to the receipt of brokered deposits; the approval of unsecured
loans to borrowers whose other loans were delinquent and whose ability to pay the loans
was never verified; loan-to-value ratios at or above 100%; and inflated and poorly docu-
mented appraisals. Id. at 493-94; see also 59 Fed. Reg. 29,486 (1994); R. DAN BRUM-
BAUGH, JR., THE COLLAPSE OF FEDERALLY INSURED DEPOSITORIES - THE SAVINGS AND
LOANS AS PRECURSOR 95, 121, 123 (1993) (discussing effect of low net worth on propensity
to make risky ADC loans); GARTEN, supra note 6, at 120; Lawrence H. White, Why Is the
U.S. Banking Industry in Trouble? Business Cycles, Loan Losses, and Deposit Insurance,
in THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN BANKING 12-13 (Lawrence H. White ed., 1993) (discussing
role of bad ADC loans in failures of the 1980s and early 1990s). Similar problems were
evident in FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1984), subsequent opinion, 622 F.
Supp. 132 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. FSLIC
v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1987). In Williams, the court denied defendant thrift
directors' summary judgment motions in response to FSLIC's allegation that defendants
were liable for approving construction loans where fees and interest were funded out of the
proceeds of the loan. Id. at 1191, 1216.
73. 18 A. 824 (N.J. Ch. 1889).
74. Id. at 830.
75. See Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 426 (2d Cir. 1943); Medford Trust Co. v.
McKnight, 197 N.E. 649, 659-60 (Mass. 1935) (holding bank directors liable for "large con-
struction loans").
76. Michelsen, 135 F.2d at 426; Medford Trust Co., 197 N.E. at 659-60; McKay, 18 A.
at 830.
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The crux of these holdings was that where existing equity was insuffi-
cient to assure repayment, banks should not lend money in the hope of
future appreciation.77 That, of course, is always the case for land devel-
opment loans because recovery is predicated on appreciation due to de-
velopment, not on the value of the undeveloped land. Obviously,
however, these three isolated holdings were powerless to deter large
losses in the 1980s from real estate development loans made by insured
financial institutions.78
The common law's failure to remedy the problem of losses from com-
mercial real estate loans prompted Congress to seek a legislative solution.
The solution was forged in FDICIA, enacted in 1991, in which Congress
specifically directed federal banking regulators to "adopt uniform regula-
tions prescribing standards for" real estate loans.79 The final regulations
and guidelines appeared on December 31, 1992 and imposed strict re-
quirements for such loans, including added repayment assurances and
stiff loan-to-value ceilings of sixty-five to eighty-five percent.8 °
Thus, commercial real estate loans are one more area in which state
court attempts to regulate banks, and specifically attempts to impose ac-
tivity bans, failed miserably. There are several apparent reasons for this
failure. The demand for commercial real estate loans by banks was so
strong that banks and states had every incentive to circumvent outright
judicial bans on those loans. Furthermore, circumvention was relatively
easy, since Williams v. McKay and its ilk had no binding effect outside the
jurisdictions in which they were decided. Even in those jurisdictions, it
was easy to distinguish those holdings on their facts. Thus, market forces
77. See Michelsen, 135 F.2d at 426 (holding workout techniques negligent because "the
hope that partial recovery on the old debt might be increased could be based only on a
speculation that real estate values would rise").
78. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 7, 9, 11,40,45-49; cf. Noble v. Baum,
No. CV 89 0265920 S, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1231, at *2, *32, *40-*41 (Conn. Super.
Ct. May 6, 1991) (holding that allegedly "imprudent acquisition, development and con-
struction" loans were sheltered by business judgment rule so as to require shareholder
demand).
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(o) (1994); see also 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994) (permitting national
banks to make real estate loans subject to § 1828(o)).
80. 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A; id.
pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A; see generally Scott A. Lindquist, Real Estate Lending Regulations:
The New Ball Game, in PROB. & PROP. 11 (May/June 1993) (discussing the regulations and
guidelines); Barbara J. Ellis, Comment, Commercial Real Estate Lending Standards Under
FDICIA: Changing the Rhythm of Boom, Bust, Crunch?, 13 ANN. R. BANKING L. 499
(1994) (same). The regulations define real estate loans broadly to include all loans "se-
cured by liens on or interests in real estate, or that are made for the purpose of financing
permanent improvements to real estate." 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.62(a), 208.52(a), 365.2(a),
563.101(a) (1995).
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and the inherent limitations of common law regulation doomed initiatives
by a handful of state courts to regulate this area.81
The 1992 federal guidelines solved the problem of piecemeal regula-
tions by imposing standards with nationwide effect. Beyond that, the
guidelines are significant for eschewing any attempt to impose an activity
ban. Instead, the guidelines chart a middle course by permitting commer-
cial real estate loans where the developer can post substantial cash or
other equity and agrees to personal guarantees and other assurances of
repayment.
This response to the judiciary's unsuccessful experimentation with ac-
tivity bans in banking leads to several observations. The first bears on the
judiciary's competence to fashion restrictions on board conduct as a mat-
ter of common law. Bright-line restrictions, such as activity bans, are ap-
pealing to some courts because these restrictions are easy to formulate
and administer. The effectiveness of such bans, however, is highly
questionable.
As the experience with common law activity bans shows, their effec-
tiveness is hampered, in part, by the limited enforcement capability of the
common law. Courts are an appropriate forum for enforcing the business
judgment rule, at least so far as the rule seeks to assure the absence of
governmental intervention, because the judiciary's role in that circum-
stance is to permit rather than restrain economic activity. But where indi-
vidual industry conditions make legal restrictions on board behavior
necessary or desirable,82 limitations on precedential effect make it impos-
sible for courts to fashion common law restrictions with nationwide
reach.83 In turn, the more permissive jurisdictions exploit their sister
states' restrictions, generating internal pressure within the restrictive
states to circumvent the few activity ban cases on the books.
As this suggests, the economic and social utility of banned activities (or
at least their potential utility) generates a market demand that is virtually
impossible for the legal system to cork. Just as it is ineffective for one
state to ban a risky activity when other states will not follow suit, it is
equally ineffective for Congress to apply such a ban to national banks
without also applying it to state-chartered banks. Similarly, an industry-
wide activity ban ultimately will fail if other, unaffected industries are
81. See WHIm, supra note 70, at 24-25 (noting that weaker state limits on real estate
loans gave state banks a competitive advantage over national banks).
82. See McCoy, supra note 5, at 8-28 (discussing such conditions in the banking
industry).
83. The only court capable of doing so would be the United States Supreme Court and
its ability in that respect is severely limited by prohibitions against federal common law.
See generally O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2054-55 (1994).
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able to siphon off customers by offering the banned services. The conse-
quent danger is that the regulated institutions will be left in a weakened
financial state.
To a lesser extent, of course, the same criticism may apply to other
regulatory techniques short of activity bans. But activity bans are partic-
ularly hard to enforce due to their capacity for overkill. That overkill
makes courts and legislators in sister jurisdictions disinclined to adopt
such bans because of the lost jobs and revenues such bans portend. It
also means that the unregulated competitors have a proportionally
greater competitive edge because competition turns on the sheer ability
to provide a product rather than the terms on which that product is
offered.
Accordingly, most courts that have reined in the business judgment
rule in banking have rejected activity bans in favor of less intrusive regu-
latory techniques. As courts moved away from bright-line tests such as
bans, however, their resolve and competence to fashion workable rules
similarly waned.
C. Other Common Law Regulatory Techniques
1. Quotas And Quota Substitutes
In place of activity bans, some courts groped toward quotas, or at least
something suggesting quotas, to supervise activities they considered too
risky. This movement is best seen in the area of loan diversification.
Limits on loans to one borrower were some of the earliest American
restrictions on bank lending. At the federal level, such restrictions date
back over 130 years, when Congress barred national banks, in the Cur-
rency Act of 1863, from lending more than ten percent of their
unimpaired capital and surplus to a single borrower. 84 Today these limits
84. Act of February 25, 1863, 12 Stat. 665 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 84
(1994)). The federal provisions were modeled after similar statutes that a handful of states
enacted to make credit available to increased numbers of borrowers. See PAUL B.
TREscOTT, FINANCING AMERICAN ENTERPRISE - THE STORY OF COMMERCIAL BANKING
29-30 (1963) (discussing state regulation of banks in the middle 1800s); Kenneth E. Scott,
The Patchwork Quilt: State and Federal Roles in Bank Regulation, 32 STAN. L. REV. 687,
707-08 (1980) (discussing various state regulations regarding single borrower limits).
These limits on national banks are still in effect, albeit in a modified form. The Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 increased federal lending limitations to 15%
of unimpaired capital and surplus for loans that are not fully secured, on top of which an
additional 10% may be loaned to any one borrower for loans fully secured by readily
marketable collateral. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a) (1994); see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 32.3, 32.4 (1995); 59
Fed. Reg. 6593 (1994). National bank directors face personal liability for participating in
or assenting to violations of the limits. See 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1994); Del Junco v. Conover,
682 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983).
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serve as "exceedingly crude devices" for ensuring diversified loan
portfolios.85
Far from providing a statutory model, however, the federal loan-to-
one-borrower provisions became a springboard for state-chartered insti-
tutions to boost their competitive advantage. It took state courts over
forty-five years to even begin incorporating analogous guidelines into the
common law standard of care. In the meantime, state-chartered banks
were able to outcompete their national bank counterparts by offering
larger aggregate loans to local businesses.
In Pocomoke City National Bank v. Crockett,86 for example, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court verdict for a thrift's direc-
tors despite the fact that they had lent almost half of the institution's
meager assets to the thrift's vice president.87 The court had no difficulty
holding that the directors' lending decision deserved deference under the
business judgment rule.88
Over the same period, however, Arkansas and Indiana courts overrode
the business judgment rule to hold overconcentrations of credit negligent
as a matter of common law. Thus in Bailey v. O'Neal,89 the Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed a directed verdict for the plaintiff-depositors, in
part because nearly half of the bank's assets had been loaned to a local
businessman and his lumber company.9" The court reasoned that the di-
rectors "must have known that, if the Kelley companies increased their
indebtedness, it would mean the insolvency of the bank."91 Similarly, in
Castetter v. Barnard,2 an Indiana appeals court reversed a verdict in
85. Scott, supra note 84, at 707-08 n.124.
86. 125 A. 712 (Md. 1924).
87. See id. at 716.
88. See id. at 713-16; see also Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Sav. Bank, 75 F. 781,
783 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896) (holding that bank directors were not liable in a shareholder suit,
despite criticizing the directors' decision to loan one-third of the thrift's capital to a promi-
nent local merchant as "unwise and hazardous").
89. 122 S.W. 503 (Ark. 1909).
90. Id. at 505.
91. Id.; cf. Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Wilhite, 233 S.W. 710, 711-12 (Ark. 1921)
(discussing directors' duty of care in case charging that the directors loaned funds "to indi-
viduals and corporations in sums greatly in excess of 30 per cent. of the capital stock of said
bank"; case dismissed for lack of standing to sue). To the same effect was Magale v.
Fomby, 201 S.W. 278 (Ark. 1918), where the Arkansas Supreme Court stated in dicta that
the directors of a county bank had been negligent for lending 60% of the bank's capital to
a start-up cannery. Id. at 280. Despite the lesson of the Magale case, the Arkansas legisla-
ture did not enact a loan-to-one-borrower statute for state-chartered institutions until 1927.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 23-32-901 (Michie 1992); 1927 Ark. Acts No. 174, § 3 (discussed in
Doyle Dry Goods v. Doddridge State Bank, 298 S.W. 863, 865 (Ark. 1927)); see also 1931
Ark. Acts No. 252, §§ 1, 2.
92. 183 N.E. 681 (Ind. App. 1934).
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favor of an officer of a failed state bank for lending "almost one-third of
the capital stock of the bank" to borrowers who were known to be insol-
vent.93 With the onset of the Great Depression, an increasing number of
states began to enact loan-to-one-borrower statutes and numerous states
have such statutes today.94
Today, common law attempts at regulation in this area have been su-
perseded by a checkerboard of state and federal statutes and regula-
tions.95 The same loan-to-one-borrower limitations that apply to national
banks now apply to federally insured savings and loan institutions.96 The
contrary is true in the case of state-chartered banks, however, where fed-
eral regulators defer in part or in whole to state law. For state member
banks, the Federal Reserve Board waives federal lending limits "[w]here
State law establishes a lending limit ... that is lower." 97 The FDIC has
gone even further and abolished federal loan-to-one-borrower restric-
tions for all insured non-member state banks, regardless of whether par-
allel state laws exist. 98
This history is interesting in several respects, not the least of which is
the use of federal statutes as templates for common law rules. Hypotheti-
cally, the lending limit provisions for national banks could have furnished
a model for common law regulation by the states. But for almost a half-
century after enactment, state courts consistently ignored national bank
lending limit provisions. Even when loan-to-one-borrower problems at
certain institutions became so egregious that state courts could not ignore
93. Id. at 686. Indiana enacted a statute restricting loans to one borrower in 1933. See
1933 Ind. Acts ch. 40, § 195; Ind. Code Ann. tit. 28, art. 1, ch. 13 (West 1987); see also 1992
Ind. Acts No. 14, §§ 16-17, 57, 83-93, 165.
94. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, BANKING STUD-
IES 286-87 (1941); Scott, supra note 84, at 707-08 (noting that the limits on loans to one
borrower range from 10 to 25% of a bank's capital and surplus); John A. Skiles, Comment,
Individual Personal Liability of Bank Directors for Negligent and Excess Loans, 7 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 185, 195-96 (1931) (discussing state and federal statutes, and noting their
loan-to-one-borrower provisions).
95. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 84(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-48 (1995); TEX. REV. STAT.
ANN. art. 342-507 (West 1995); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 103(1) (McKinney 1995); see also
Scott, supra note 84, at 727 (describing differences between state and federal statutes).
96. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(u) (1994) (specifying loan-to-one-borrower regulations appli-
cable to federally insured thrift institutions); 12 C.F.R. § 563.93 (1995) (same); 59 Fed. Reg.
58,146 (1994); supra note 84 and accompanying text (noting the federal loan-to-one-bor-
rower provision).
97. 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(i), n.2 (1995); see id. pt. 215, subpt. A, app.
98. 58 Fed. Reg. 64,460-61 (1993). Previously, federal loan-to-one-borrower limita-
tions did not apply to state non-member banks insured by the Bank Insurance Fund. The
new rule extends the same treatment to state non-member banks insured by the Savings
Association Insurance Fund. Id. at 64,461.
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them, none of the courts that penalized those loans embraced a test as
demanding as the federal statutory limit for national banks. 99
Why this fierce resistance to wholesale incorporation of the federal
lending limits? Obviously, much of the explanation lies in perceived limi-
tations on judicial authority and competence. Many state court judges
undoubtedly believed they lacked a mandate to incorporate numerical
federal guidelines into the common law when their legislatures had not
seen fit to adopt those guidelines by statute.
Nonetheless, federal lending limits did leave their mark on state courts
and legislatures.100 After all, many states eventually did adopt
mandatory loan diversification in some form, if not in the federal law's
exact particulars. For the most part, however, state courts and legisla-
tures acted only when forced to by bank crises or especially notorious
bank failures, most notably during the Great Depression. In the
meantime, the limited applicability of federal lending limits for national
banks created economic incentives for state courts and legislatures to de-
lay adopting lending limits as long as politically feasible.
Conversely, the judiciary's propensity to hint at loan diversification
quotas without embracing them outright motivated state legislatures to
take action. The appeal of statutory lending limits lies in their seemingly
easy-to-apply quantitative formulas. Nonetheless, every court that penal-
ized loan overconcentrations rejected mathematical formulas in favor of
the usual ad hoc assessments that common law courts employed. The
upshot was that banks affected by those rulings had little if any guidance
about how much diversification was necessary in order to avoid exposure.
The ensuing confusion put pressure on the states to enact quantitative
lending limit statutes.10' As this phenomenon occurred, the common law
rulings fell into disuse.
Internal inconsistency proved to be another drawback of common law
regulation. Some courts have recently condemned loans made outside of
an institution's geographical trade area as negligent." 2 But if loan diver-
99. E.g., Seiffert v. State, 501 S.W.2d 124, 127-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (finding that
the state's borrowing limit applied to single, and not aggregate, loans). But see id. at 129-30
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that such a construction runs afoul of the federal stat-
ute, which provided the model for the state); State Nat'l Bank v. Tittle, 183 S.W.2d 720, 723
(Tex. 1944) (refusing to combine loans made to an individual and a corporation even where
the individual handed the proceeds over to the corporation).
100. Compare, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 84(a) (1994) (discussed supra in note 84); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 53-48(b) (1995) (adopting federal limits) with TEx. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-507
(West 1995) (setting a 25% limit).
101. See supra notes 91, 94-95.
102. See FDIC v. Robertson, No. 87-2623-S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292, at *13-*14,
*16, *19 (D. Kan. July 24, 1989) (holding directors liable for loans outside regular lending
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sification, the goal of the common law limitations on loans to one bor-
rower, is desirable, then geographical restrictions undermine that goal by
making a higher proportion of an institution's assets captive to downturns
in local economies, as happened in Texas and California in the 1980s.
Consolidation of regulatory policy in Congress and the executive branch
can help eliminate some, if not all, of these inconsistencies.
10 3
For these reasons, the law of lending limits has repudiated common law
rules in favor of codified, quantitative standards. At the same time, fed-
eral lending limit law incorporates a deference to state law that is un-
characteristic of most modern lending regulation. This is a rare example
in lending of federal bank regulators deferring to state law rather than
exercising their statutory power to impose stricter federal regulations
across the board. While the FDIC reserves the right to reinstate federal
restrictions "provided that there is a safety or soundness basis to do
so,' 104 only time will tell if the FDIC's deference to state law standards
will trigger the "race to the bottom" that has been typical of state lending
regulation in the past.
areas); FDIC v. Stanley, 770 F. Supp. 1281, 1290, 1312-13 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (holding bank
directors liable for acquiring a lease secured solely by heavy machinery located outside the
geographical area of the bank), aff'd sub nom. FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir.
1993); cf. RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (D. Utah 1993) (alleging that thrift direc-
tors negligently, and in breach of their fiduciary duty, failed "to restrict lending to a certain
geographic area").
103. That said, regulatory policy in this area is hardly free from inconsistency. The
holdings in the cases just discussed emanate from litigation positions of the federal govern-
ment designed to maximize recovery. In contrast, the 1992 federal real estate loan regula-
tions and guidelines take a decidedly more neutral stance and simply require financial
institutions to "[i]dentify the geographic areas in which the institution will consider lend-
ing" and "set limits for real estate loans by ... geographic market .... Interagency
Guidelines for Real Estate Lending Policies, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,896 (1992); see 12 C.F.R. pt.
563, subpt. D, app. A (1995) (discussing geographic market area conditions); 60 Fed. Reg.
35,674, 35,679 (1995) (noting that lenders should consider "the nature of the markets in
which loans will be made").
104. 58 Fed. Reg. 64,461 (1993). In lifting federal lending restrictions on insured non-
member banks, the FDIC gave as its principal reason: "Congress could have imposed on all
state banks a loan to one borrower limit.., but did not do so when it enacted FDICIA."
Id. This is reminiscent of statements from the early 1980s when officials of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board erroneously maintained that they did not have authority to issue
regulations restraining state-chartered thrifts from engaging in high-risk activities. See
GAO, THRIFT FAILURES: COSTLY FAILURES RESULTED FROM REGULATORY VIOLATIONS
AND UNSAFE PRACTICES 75 (June 1989); GAO, FAILED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: REA-
SONS, COSTS, REMEDIES AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES 32 (Jan. 13, 1989); see also GAO,
FAILED THRIFTS, INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT CONDU-
CIVE TO FRAUD, INSIDER ABUSE, AND RELATED UNSAFE PRACTICES 30 (Mar. 22, 1989);
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 670 F. Supp. 449, 451-52 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 856
F.2d 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The only difference is that the FDIC maintains it has authority
to impose federal restrictions but chooses not to exercise that authority. See 58 Fed. Reg.
64,461.
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2. Mandatory Loan Terms
In addition to supervising the makeup of overall loan portfolios, for
years common law courts have dictated to bank boards the substantive
terms of individual loans. The effect of these rulings has been to insert
judicially-mandated, prophylactic terms into the structure of individual
loans.
Collateral parity - For over a century, courts have scrutinized bank
loans for evidence of sufficient collateral. 10 5 As a general rule, courts
have required collateral equal to the face amount of the loan, i.e., one-to-
one parity between the loan value and collateral.1 °6 Conversely, where
loans appeared adequately secured at the time of approval, courts have
105. See FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 129 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming judgment against
bank director who approved a $125,000 loan based solely on a personal guaranty); Gamble
v. Brown, 29 F.2d 366, 375 (4th Cir. 1928) (stating that "it was reasonable to believe that
the property was sufficient security for the loan"), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 839 (1929);
Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Sav. Bank, 75 F. 781, 784 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896) (rendering
verdict for directors accused of failing to perfect security on loans); FDIC v. Robertson,
No. 87-2623-S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292, at *15, *19 (D. Kan. July 24, 1989); First Nat'l
Bank v. Keller, 318 F. Supp. 339, 348 (N.D. I11. 1970) (stating that "[blank records offered
by defendant demonstrate ... that the value of the collateral for the initial secured loans to
all three corporations exceeded the amount of the loans"); Wynn v. Tallapoosa County
Bank, 53 So. 228, 239-41 (Ala. 1910) (reversing judgment against cashier in part because of
lack of proof of unsecured loans); Castetter v. Barnard, 183 N.E. 681, 686 (Ind. App. 1932)
(affirming verdict that unsecured loan was negligent); Scott's Ex'rs v. Young, 21 S.W.2d
994, 998-99 (Ky. 1929) (absolving directors on one note that "was secured by a mortgage
on real estate" and on another that "was secured by an insurance policy and a personal
surety"); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 709 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (noting that the collat-
eral was "found by the defendants to have a value more than sufficient for the purpose" of
securing the loan); Broderick v. Marcus, 272 N.Y.S. 455, 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934) (stating
that the bank "disregard[ed] ... all sound banking principles" in making "speculative,
unsecured and improvident loans"); Williams v. Fidelity Loan & Sav. Co., 128 S.E. 615,621
(Va. 1925) (affirming verdict for loan company's officers and directors after examining tes-
timony that collateral was carefully scrutinized for adequate security); cf Alliance Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 782 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir.) (affirming agency decision to
put institution into conservatorship where the institution had made $540,000 in unsecured
commercial loans), modified on other grounds, 790 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
First State Bank v. FDIC, 770 F.2d 81, 82 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming FDIC cease-and-desist
order based partially on allegations that respondents "extend[ed] credit that was not ade-
quately secured"); Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 835-38 (N.J. Ch. 1889) (ruling that an
investment in commercial paper based solely on personal guarantees was imprudent).
106. See, e.g., Keller, 318 F. Supp. at 348 (finding that the value of the collateral did
initially exceed the amount of the loans); Litwin, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 709 (commenting that the
defendants did pay heed to the value of the collateral offered to secure the loans). But see
Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1171-72 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that
loans with no collateral fell within business judgment rule); Noble v. Baum, No. CV 89
0265 920 S, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1231, at *2, *7, *40-*41 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 6,
1991) (holding business judgment rule protected bank loans made with no borrower
equity).
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refused to assess liability for losses occasioned by subsequent declines in
collateral value.
Decisions that scrutinized insufficient security on the loan's face usu-
ally involved bank directors who approved such loans in hopes that the
collateral would appreciate sufficiently by maturity to assure repayment.
Early decisions in this area were split. A few early cases held directors
responsible for losses from secured loans where the principal exceeded
the face amount of the security, unless bank by-laws permitted the
loans. 10 7 Other cases invoked the business judgment rule to shield board
decisions to approve inadequately secured loans where the decisions were
made in anticipation that economic conditions would improve.10 8
Today this debate has been resolved in favor of caution. Modern cases
hold that inadequate security on the face of a loan constitutes negligence,
irrespective of by-laws.1"9 In addition, the 1992 federal regulations on
107. See, e.g., Citizens Bldg. Loan & Sav. Ass'n v. Coriell, 34 N.J. Eq. 383,397 (N.J. Ch.
1881); cf Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 20, 24-25 (Pa. 1872) (affirming dismissal of com-
plaint against directors for loans made upon "very doubtful collaterals" where counsel had
advised them that the loans were authorized under the corporate charter). In the analo-
gous case of Michelsen v. Penney, the Second Circuit affirmed a judgment against directors
in part because they salvaged the bank's junior mortgage on a foreclosed office building at
high expense, "even though the offices were only half rented and despite the fact that the
Miami real estate boom had burst and the bank was already gorged with real estate." 135
F.2d 409, 422 (2d Cir. 1943); see also infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (discussing
the Hun decision).
108. In McRoberts v. Spaulding, directors who made inadequately secured farm loans
during the 1920 depression were absolved even though the value of the collateral remained
stagnant and the loans went into default. 32 F.2d 315, 316-17 (S.D. Iowa 1929); accord
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677, 720-21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (declining to hold bank
directors liable for granting loans in October 1930 based on anticipated increases in the
borrowers' earnings, noting defendants "did not expect" a continuing decline, "but on the
contrary definitely expected the tide to turn"); cf. Wallace v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 15 S.W.
448, 451 (Tenn. 1891) (overturning a judgment against directors for their erroneous deci-
sion to delay the sale of foreclosed properties in the false hope of a better market).
109. See FDIC v. Robertson, No. 87-2623-S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292, at *13-*14,
*16, *20 (D. Kan. July 24, 1989); cf. Alliance Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 782 F.2d
490, 494-96 (5th Cir.) (affirming agency decision to put institution into conservatorship
where "the real and personal property securing [certain] ... loans had been determined to
be largely of no value"), modified on other grounds, 790 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam).
Courts do not consider all unsecured loans negligent. Both judges and bank regulators
have provided scant guidance on this issue. For example, in Scott's Ex'rs v. Young, the
Kentucky Supreme Court held that directors who made a $2,700 unsecured loan to a bank
cashier earning $160 per month were not negligent, noting: "[Mioral character, business
integrity, and thrift play no small part among business men in determining the soundness
and prudence of a transaction." 21 S.W.2d 994, 998 (Ky. 1929) (citing Wallace v. Lincoln
Sav. Bank, 15 S.W. 448 (Tenn. 1891)). Similarly, in Atherton v. Anderson, the court stated
in dictum that "[m]uch depends upon the financial worth and moral character of the bor-
rower. He might unquestionably be solvent and if so there is no absolute duty to take
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real estate loans require banks and thrifts, in assessing collateral ade-
quacy, to "monitor conditions in the real estate market ... to ensure that
[their] real estate lending policies continue to be appropriate for current
market conditions."'1 ° Thus, bank directors today must heed current
market conditions in evaluating collateral sufficiency; they cannot ap-
prove inadequately secured loans on the gambit that collateral values will
improve.
Where directors have discharged that duty, courts have been loath to
penalize them for unexpected declines in the economy. Almost invaria-
bly, older cases absolved bank directors for approving adequately secured
loans whose collateral subsequently declined in value due to deflation. 1 '
This limitation on director liability continues to be true today. 1 2 These
holdings flow from the long-held precept that mistaken predictions about
collateral because there is no necessity for it .... 99 F.2d 883, 895 (6th Cir. 1938); see also
Starrels, 870 F.2d at 1171-72; First Nat'l Bank v. Keller, 318 F. Supp. 339, 348 (N.D. Ill.
1970) (holding unsecured loans not negligent where one was "a joint obligation" of three
individuals and the other was "guaranteed by another of the individuals"); Noble, 1991
Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1231, at *2, *7, *40-*41. Current federal regulations require col-
lateral solely for real estate loans. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
110. 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.62(c), 208.52(c), 365.2(c), 563.101(c) (1995).
111. See Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Say. Bank, 75 F. 781, 784 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896)
(ruling that loans that appeared sound when made, but that went into default due to the
"extreme financial stringency and panic of the summer and fall of 1893" and a "fall in the
price of cotton," were not negligent); Milburn v. Martin, 76 S.W.2d 952, 954-55 (Ark. 1934)
(reversing verdict against the bank directors for bank failure where the bank would have
remained open "but for the total collapse of all values, which was not peculiar to that
locality"); Ford v. Taylor, 4 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Ark. 1928) (reversing judgment against direc-
tors where most of the loans challenged were "made in more prosperous times and to
persons who were regarded as good when these loans were made" but who were unable to
pay following a "crushing depreciation in values"); Muller v. Planters' Bank & Trust Co.,
275 S.W. 750, 751 (Ark. 1925) (finding no liability because "while most of [the] securities
were of little value at the time of the liquidation, they were good at the time the loans were
made, and ... the losses occurred by reason of general depreciation in property values");
Gallin v. National City Bank, 273 N.Y.S. 87,102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934) (rejecting "plaintiffs'
contention ... that the directors, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have foreseen the
fact that the market was likely to crash" on October 28, 1929); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11,
20, 24 (Pa. 1872) (affirming dismissal of complaint against directors for loans that went into
default due to market crash immediately preceding the Civil War); cf Williams v. Fidelity
Loan & Sav. Co., 128 S.E. 615, 622 (Va. 1925) (ruling in favor of finance company directors
who expanded into automobile consumer financing only months before the 1920
depression).
112. See FDIC v. Stanley, 770 F. Supp. 1281, 1300-01 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (finding directors
not liable for uncollectible loans because the drought, livestock disease, business down-
turns, and marital problems that caused the borrowers to default were unforeseeable),
aff'd sub nom. FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993).
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future events, such as business and economic trends, will receive blanket
protection under the business judgment rule.' 1 3
In sum, at common law, where the collateral originally was equal in
value to the loan, bank directors could safely assume that current eco-
nomic conditions would hold and did not have to consider possible eco-
nomic downturns. The only banking decision to the contrary was Hun v.
Cary,114 in which the New York Court of Appeals condemned a decision
to buy a lot at fair market value because the possibility of falling land
values made the investment unduly speculative. The court noted:
It matters not that the trustees purchased this lot for no more
than a fair value, and that the loss was occasioned by the subse-
quent general decline in the value of real estate. They had no
right to expose their bank to the hazard of such a decline. If the
purchase was an improper one when made, it matters not that
the loss came from the unavoidable fall in the value of the real
estate purchased.115
Significantly, Hun's idea that directors should answer in damages for
adequately secured loans or investments that expose a bank "to the haz-
ard of a decline" has never gained currency, either in the courts, Con-
gress, or among bank regulators, and no federal law imposes such a
requirement today.116 By no means, however, is such a requirement in-
conceivable. Economic booms and busts are a well-documented fact, and
bankers are well-advised to anticipate them in long-range planning. So
113. Wallace, supra note 1, at 1230-31; Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied sub nom. Citytrust v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
114. 82 N.Y. 65 (N.Y. 1880).
115. Id. at 78 (emphasis added); cf Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 830-34 (N.J. Ch.
1889) (holding bankers liable for issuing junior mortgages where the first mortgage con-
sumed the entire value of the collateral; a subsequent decline in land values was no
defense).
Hun is factually distinguishable from most other cases on this subject because the direc-
tors knew the bank was headed into insolvency and nevertheless gave construction the go-
ahead. Compare 82 N.Y. at 75-77 with cases cited supra in notes 111-12. See also Dooley,
supra note 2, at 480 n.60; Dyson, supra note 1, at 370. Thus, the trustees' decision in Hun
was unreasonable based on current financial data, even without taking a potential eco-
nomic decline into account. The fact that Hun involved a mutual savings bank also helps
explain its outcome. See McCoy, supra note 5, at 39-43.
116. If, however, collateral values drop sufficiently to endanger safety and soundness,
regulators can attempt to redress the problem through a cease-and-desist order. See Bank
of Dixie v. FDIC, 766 F.2d 175, 176 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that "although these loans were
adequately secured when made, the value of the collateral securing these loans, contrary to
the expectations of management, had declined so that the loans were no longer adequately
protected"); cf [Anonymous] v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 866, 867 n.2 (D.D.C. 1985) (noting
that, in agency suspension and prohibition proceedings, FDIC had alleged that bank loans
"were inadequately protected by the current sound worth of the borrower or the collateral
pledged").
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why, as a matter of law, excuse directors from anticipating such cycles?
In part it is because the length and depth of booms and troughs are diffi-
cult to predict.117 Furthermore, the specter of liability for possibly erro-
neous predictions could paralyze bank boards. For these reasons, federal
regulators instead have sought to address concerns about fluctuating busi-
ness cycles by increasing assurances of repayment at the outset, both
through higher loan-to-value ratios and personal guarantees.'
18
Conversely, the rule that borrowers post collateral equal to the face
amount of the loan at the time of approval experienced surprising longev-
ity in contrast with other judicially-crafted bank regulatory rules. Unlike
most common law efforts at bank regulation, this rule was widely adopted
by state courts, cut across all regions of the country, and displayed unpar-
alleled staying power.
Why? In part, it is because judicial collateral rules, unlike profit poten-
tial analyses, activity bans, or loan diversification standards, derive di-
rectly from traditional bank underwriting norms.1 19 Thus, courts did
nothing more than enforce industry standards when they articulated col-
lateral rules. This same dynamic also helped suppress the usual competi-
tive pressures to loosen the rules, because significant segments of bankers
had reason to urge regulators to enforce collateral rules against bankers
who threatened to deviate. Finally, the collateral rules were easy to ad-
minister, at least until recently, because most courts gave directors the
benefit of the doubt absent proof of inadequate collateral.' 20  Thus,
117. See, e.g., McRoberts v. Spaulding, 32 F.2d 315, 316-17 (S.D. Iowa 1929); Litwin v.
Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677, 720-21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
118. See supra notes 70-71, infra notes 125, 144 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., L.H. LANGSTON, BANKING ACCOUNTING PRACTICE 96-97, 235-36 (1937)
(noting that "[s]ecured loans are made with the understanding that the borrower will main-
tain a margin. A margin means merely that total market value of the collateral must al-
ways exceed the face amount of the loan by a certain percentage").
120. See, e.g., McRoberts, 32 F.2d at 316; Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 832 (N.J. Ch.
1889). With the onset of the Great Depression, some courts ceased taking appraisals at
face value and scrutinized them more critically. See, e.g., Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight,
197 N.E. 649, 658-59, 664 (Mass. 1935); Litwin, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 709-28. Today, most courts
inquire whether appraisals are outdated, "inflated or insufficiently documented," although
a minority still protects appraisals under the business judgment rule. See RTC v. Rahn, 854
F. Supp. 480,490 (W.D. Mich. 1994); RTC v. Ascher, No. 92-B-424, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1827, at *24 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 1994), modified on other grounds, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2699 (D. Colo. Feb. 25, 1994); RTC v. Norris, 830 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S.D. Tex. 1993); cf.
Alliance Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 782 F.2d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir.), modified on
other grounds, 790 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). But see FDIC v. Stahl, 854 F.
Supp. 1565, 1568, 1571 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (direizting verdict for director defendants accused
of approving loans despite inadequate appraisals, based on the business judgment rule);
First Nat'l Bank v. Keller, 318 F. Supp. 339, 348 (N.D. I1. 1970) (taking appraisal values at
face value where "[pilaintiff offered no evidence to show the value of [the] collateral"). In
FIRREA, Congress directed federal banking agencies to promulgate rules regulating loan
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although the collateral rules might appear to require courts to engage in
economic analysis, courts used evidentiary rules to avoid wading into that
sticky area.
Despite the longevity of judicial collateral rules, ultimately, they too
were trumped by federal code-based standards in the form of loan-to-
value ratios. Such ratios seek to mitigate the effects of future downward
business trends by raising the amount of required collateral as a buffer
against possible later declines in collateral value. The judiciary's inability
or unwillingness to tackle the very real problem of downswings in busi-
ness cycles, and thus collateral values, ultimately doomed this most en-
during of substantive judicial rules.
Loan-to-value ratios - Loan-to-value ratios are a variation on the
principle of collateral parity, one that requires the collateral to exceed
loan value by a stated percentage. Calculated by dividing the loan
amount by the value of the collateral, 121 the purpose of loan-to-value ra-
tios is twofold. First, they help ensure that borrowers have sufficient eq-
uity in a project so they have strong incentives not to walk away from a
loan. Second, they protect against economic downturns by ensuring that
collateral values will remain sufficient for repayment even if the collateral
declines in value.
National banks have long been subject to loan-to-value ratios under
the National Banking Act. 122 State legislatures, however, were slow to
adopt such measures for state-chartered banks. 123 Until recently, no re-
ported case held that excessive loan-to-value ratios formed a basis for
suit, and even recent cases have been divided. 124 In contrast, the 1992
real estate guidelines address this issue in detail for state and federal fi-
nancial institutions alike. Those guidelines embrace stiff ratios ranging
appraisals and the regulations appeared in final form in June 1994. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3351
(1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 29,482 (1994) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.41-34.47, 208.18, 225.61-
225.67, 323.1-323.7, 545.32, 545.103 and 564.1-564.8 (1995)).
121. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app'. C; id. pt. 365, app. A;
id. pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A.
122. 12 U.S.C.A. § 371a, Historical and Statutory Notes, at 191-92 (1994); 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1464, Historical and Statutory Notes, at 701 (1994); see also supra note 70.
123. See WHITE, supra note 70, at 24. Before 1914, Minnesota was the only state that
had adopted loan-to-value limits. Id. at 23-24.
124. Compare Rahn, 854 F. Supp. at 491 (ruling that "the business judgment rule ...
does not protect" loan-to-value calculations based on allegedly inflated data) with Stahl,
854 F. Supp. at 1591 (directing verdict, on business judgment rule grounds, for director
defendants who approved commercial loans without proof of sufficient borrower equity);
cf. Alliance Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 782 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir.) (affirming
agency order putting association into conservatorship due in part to major construction
loans with 100% loan-to-value ratios; "[t]hese loans had little or no cash equity and Alli-
ance thus assumed the total risk"), modified on other grounds, 790 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam).
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from sixty-five percent for loans on undeveloped land to eighty-five per-
cent for loans on improved property.
125
As with loan-to-one-borrower limits, courts proved noticeably queasy
about setting quantitative standards for loan-to-value ratios. In one
sense, the judiciary's hesitancy in this regard is curious, since the many
cases requiring parity in collateral amount to holdings that the ratio of a
loan to its collateral cannot exceed one hundred percent. This hesitancy,
though, is best understood as a reflection of the judiciary's traditional
refusal to engage in the regulation of future business cycles. A one-hun-
dred-percent ratio simply seeks to assure repayment based on currently
ascertainable business conditions; a ratio of anything less seeks to assure
repayment in the event of a future economic decline. In the latter situa-
tion, courts apparently do not consider themselves competent to deter-
mine how low those ratios have to be in order to afford reasonable
protection. Accordingly, both out of concern for judicial competence and
to achieve nationwide effect, the formulation of loan-to-value ratios has
fallen, by default, to Congress and federal bank regulators.
Bans on junior liens - As a supplement to collateral parity rules,
courts also tried to enhance repayment assurances by regulating junior
liens, largely through the familiar device of bans. Nineteenth-century
courts reviewing negligence complaints were divided over the prudence
of securing loans with already-encumbered property. In 1881, in Citizens
Building, Loan & Savings Association v. Coriell,12 6 for example, the New
Jersey Court of Chancery declined to hold directors liable for loans se-
cured solely by junior mortgages (in one instance, an eighth and a ninth),
reasoning that the association's constitution and by-laws did not require
first liens.127
Only eight years later, however, in Williams v. McKay,128 the same
court rejected junior mortgages as negligent, stating: "[A]n important el-
ement in the consideration that leads to the condemnation of an invest-
ment may be that its security was impaired by large prior
incumbrances. '' 129 The Williams court held that second and third mort-
gages were negligent because there was insufficient value left after the
125. 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A; id.
pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A. The guidelines permit financial institutions to exceed the loan-
to-value limits "based on the support provided by other credit factors," as long as the
aggregate value of such loans does not exceed 100% of total capital. Id.
126. 34 N.J. Eq. 383 (N.J. Ch. 1881).
127. Id. at 384-88, 390-93.
128. 18 A. 824 (N.J. Ch. 1889).
129. Id. at 830.
1995] 1061
Catholic University Law Review
first lien to satisfy the junior mortgages.1 30 As the court pointed out, to
preserve the collateral in the event of default, the bank would have to
buy out the senior liens at a higher price than the original loan and possi-
bly in excess of the property's value.13 1
Recent decisions have followed Williams and condemned bank loans
that are secured by junior liens. 132 In contrast, the 1992 federal real es-
tate guidelines take a more flexible approach by requiring loan officers to
subtract the value of senior liens before calculating loan-to-value ratios,
rather than prohibiting junior liens outright. 133
The treatment of junior liens is one more area where judicial propen-
sity for bright-line rules resulted in outcomes that were needlessly harsh.
There is nothing wrong with a junior lien per se if sufficient value is left
after subtracting the senior lien. Evidently uncomfortable with such eco-
nomic analyses, however, courts banned junior liens outright, placing un-
due constraints on credit availability in the process. Apparently,
administrative agencies, by virtue of their financial expertise, consider
themselves better equipped than courts to fine-tune legal rules so that
economically rational junior liens are permitted, while economically irra-
tional junior liens are filtered out.
Bans on specific forms of security - The same propensity toward bans
that afflicted judicial regulation of junior liens also afflicts the new set of
court decisions on appropriate forms of bank collateral. Early state
courts rarely troubled themselves with the form that security took.134 In
130. Id. at 830-34.
131. Id. at 830-31; accord Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 421-22 (2d Cir. 1943).
132. FDIC v. Stanley, 770 F. Supp. 1281, 1292-93, 1296-98, 1313-14 (N.D. Ind. 1991),
aff'd sub nom. FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Robertson, No. 87-
2623-S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292, at *4, *14, *17 (D. Kan. July 24, 1989), modified on
other grounds, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13017 (D. Kan. Oct. 23, 1989); cf. Alliance Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 782 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir.) (affirming agency decision to put
institution into conservatorship where lender had a second mortgage on one loan and a
fifth lien on another), modified on other grounds, 790 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
Bank of Dixie v. FDIC, 766 F.2d 175, 176 n.1, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming FDIC
holding that "loans ... which were secured by collateral subject to substantial senior liens"
were unsafe and unsound).
133. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A;
id. pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A.
134. In Citizens Bldg., Loan & Sav. Ass'n v. Coriell, a rare contrary example, the court
considered excusing bank directors for approving shareholder loans, in violation of the
association's constitution, that were secured solely by securities and not by real estate. 34
N.J. Eq. 383, 394-96 (N.J. Ch. 1881). Despite the charter violation and obvious conflict-of-
interest overtones, the court was inclined against liability because the loans were permitted
under the original by-laws (which also violated the constitution) and because a majority of
the other shareholders supposedly had acquiesced in the practice. Id. Ultimately, how-
ever, it imposed liability because the by-laws had been amended to prohibit the loan. Id. at
396-98.
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the past five years, however, an increasing number of courts have con-
demned discrete types of loan collateral as unduly risky. Recent courts
have imposed liability for collateral consisting of stock in a closed corpo-
1316ration,"' inventory and accounts receivable in a start-up corporation,136
and heavy manufacturing equipment such as bulldozers that "depreciate
rapidly and .. .are subject to vandalism and theft." '137 The 1992 real
estate lending regulations approach this topic considerably more flexibly
and permit real estate loans to be secured by insured deposits, financial
instruments and bullion, as well as any other collateral with a quantifiable
value in which the lender has perfected a security interest.138
As in the area of junior liens, the case law in this area has been plagued
by overkill. It is easy to envision situations, for example, in which stock
in an established, successful closed corporation would be more than suffi-
cient collateral for a bank loan. Nevertheless, the judiciary's propensity
has been to prohibit whole classes of collateral categorically, making cer-
tain valuable collateral off-limits and artificially hampering credit availa-
bility in the process. Courts that have tread in this area have exhibited a
near phobia about incorporating economic analysis into the common law
rules. As a result, in the credit crunch of the late 1980s and early 1990s, it
fell to expert regulatory agencies to fashion rules that mandate individu-
alized economic analyses in lieu of the judiciary's categorical bans.
Bans on pre-funded interest - In the 1980s, real estate development
loans commonly were structured so that the early years of interest would
be prepaid out of the loan proceeds pending the completion of construc-
tion.139 Such clauses were used to finance undercapitalized developers
whose principal source of repayment was future revenues from the pro-
ject itself. This practice was not new and courts had tolerated it for de-
135. Robertson, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292, at *5-*6, *8, *16, *19; see Bailey v.
O'Neal, 122 S.W. 503, 505 (Ark. 1909) (condemning collateral that consisted of stock in the
borrowing company); Bank of Mutual Redemption v. Hill, 56 Me. 385, 387, 389 (Me. 1868).
136. Robertson, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292, at *9, *20; Omnibank v. United Southern
Bank, 607 So.2d 76, 87 (Miss. 1992).
137. Stanley, 770 F. Supp. at 1290-91, 1313. The Stanley court, however, declined to
hold bank directors liable for farm loans secured by income-producing livestock and crops
that were insured. Id. at 1293, 1295, 1299-1300, 1303-04; accord Wheeler v. Aiken County
Loan & Sav. Bank, 75 F. 781, 783 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896). Federal bank regulators have issued
an interagency policy statement easing documentation requirements for farm loans by
banks and thrifts with high examination ratings and adequate capital. OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., INTERAGENCY POLICY STATEMENT ON Docu-
MENTATION OF LOANS (Mar. 30, 1993); cf Scott, supra note 84, at 731-32 (noting statutes
relaxing loan-to-one-borrower restrictions for loans secured by agricultural products).
138. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A;
id. pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A.
139. See FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184, 1191 (D. Md. 1984), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. FSLIC v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1987).
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cades.14 ° In 1984, in FSLIC v. Williams,14' however, a court imposed
negligence liability for the first time in a case involving pre-funded inter-
est. 142 Bank regulators now frown on such clauses and the 1992 federal
real estate loan guidelines advise banks to formulate internal standards
"for the acceptability of and limits on the use of interest reserves."'
143
Despite recent attention to the danger of pre-funded interest clauses,
federal regulators and most courts, apart from Williams, have not seen fit
to prohibit them, apparently having concluded that such clauses have suf-
ficient potential usefulness when combined with other payment guaran-
tees. Federal regulators even have avoided specifying substantive
standards for the use of such clauses, instead requiring financial institu-
tions to set those standards themselves under the eye of bank examin-
ers.144 This approach has the benefit of enlisting industry support and
expertise. Its drawback, however, lies in possibly lax standards and
murky liability if institutions set their standards too low. Thus, while fed-
eral regulators have occupied the field, the lack of any substantive code-
based rule means that common law negligence standards could continue
to play a role. What those standards would be, however, remains unclear
140. For example, see Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940), which
declined to find liability on the following facts:
Recognizing the fact that loan interest was to be provided for the first year out of
the proceeds of the loan so as to make it easier for the borrowers, by giving time
for the development of income on the real estate, they still felt that the borrowers
would be able to pay interest thereafter. This belief was justified in their eyes by
the appraisers' earnings estimates on the real property, among other things.
Id. at 720.
141. 599 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds
sub nom. FSLIC v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1987).
142. Id. at 1191; FSLIC v. Williams, 622 F. Supp. 132, 133 (D. Md. 1985). In Williams,
FSLIC had charged the defendants, among other things, with "deducting interest and fees
from undis[b]ursed loan funds rather than requiring the borrowers to pay those charges,"
and "taking charges into income when they had not been paid by the borrower." 599 F.
Supp. at 1191. See also FDIC v. Schreiner, 892 F. Supp. 869, 876 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding
that extending "additional funds to pay the interest on past due credit" was potentially
negligent).
143. 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A; id.
pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A.
144. Regulation of non-recourse loans follows a similar approach. As with pre-paid
interest clauses, recent courts are split on whether non-recourse loans fall within the ambit
of the business judgment rule. Compare FDIC v. Stahl, 854 F. Supp. 1565, 1571 (S.D. Fla.
1994) (overturning jury verdict against directors for loans made without written personal
guaranties) with RTC v. Rahn, 854 F. Supp. 480, 490-91 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (denying sum-
mary judgment for defendants where equity partner in commercial real estate loan as-
sumed no "significant liability" as to the loan). Federal regulations now require insured
financial institutions to adopt "[Ilimits on partial recourse or nonrecourse loans" without
specifying the nature of those limits. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt.
208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A; id. pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A.
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and could be anything from the ban suggested in Williams to deference
under the business judgment rule.
3. Creditworthiness Determinations
The recent trend of the cases discussed so far has been to require that
loans incorporate substantive safeguards. Where those safeguards are
adopted, courts give bank directors considerable latitude in determining a
loan applicant's creditworthiness. For instance, in two recent cases,
courts denied recovery where banks approved loans despite weak finan-
cial statements because other factors about the borrowers increased the
prospects for repayment. 145 Thus, the business judgment rule still is fol-
lowed today in the inherently subjective domain of credit determinations.
If a director can support a subjective creditworthiness determination with
objective evidence of favorable financial indicators, courts appear reluc-
tant to second-guess the loan decision. This state of the law can be ex-
pected to continue as long as loan regulations remain flexible with respect
to risk assessment.
4. Loan Administration
The final example of substantive judicial regulation of day-to-day bank
board decisions concerns the area of loan administration. The judiciary
has intervened in two areas in this regard, the administration of collateral
and bank treatment of delinquent loans.
145. In a split verdict in FDIC v. Stanley, the court noted that a weak financial state-
ment alone is not grounds for negligence if other factors about the borrower give assur-
ances of repayment. 770 F. Supp. 1281, 1288-89, 1295-96, 1313-14 (N.D. Ind. 1991), aff'd
sub nom. FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993). Thus, the Stanley court ruled for
the defendants on certain farm and small business loans where, despite high debt loads and
losses, the applicants had significant equity in land or showed improving trends in revenues
and debt reduction. Id. at 1294-95, 1299-1300, 1304.
Likewise, in Washington Bancorporation v. Said, the court rejected FDIC claims that the
directors of the National Bank of Washington acted negligently in approving a $10 million
credit line to a prominent law firm that disbanded a year later. 812 F. Supp. 1256 (D.D.C.
1993). The FDIC's negligence charge proceeded solely from the fact that the directors had
not obtained the law firm's first quarter financial statements before extending credit. Id. at
1269. Labeling that omission irrelevant, the court observed the directors had relied on the
law firm's "more-than-adequate prior year financial statements" as well as an averment by
one of the law firm's managing partners that no material change in the firm's financial
status had occurred. Id. The court further noted that: (1) the firm had repaid its prior
credit line in full; (2) the prior year financial statements showed sufficient assets and reve-
nues to repay the loan; (3) the bank had recourse against the firm's partners and their
personal assets were sufficient to insure repayment; and (4) there were no red flags that the
firm was in danger. Id. at 1263-64, 1269-70.
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a. Collateral Administration
Over the years, a handful of courts have addressed the need to perfect
and retain security interests. Somewhat surprisingly, given the judiciary's
emphasis on sufficient collateral, most older rulings erred on the side of
laxity. Most of those courts gave directors latitude in whether to perfect
security interests and release those interests before repayment. 146 The
one early contrary decision, Williams v. McKay,' 47 penalized the prema-
ture release of security before repayment.148 Today, the 1992 federal real
estate regulations require bank lenders to perfect security interests and
courts treat the failure to do so as negligence. 49
The older cases illustrate the difficulty of achieving consistent judicial
enforcement even of well-imbedded common law standards of care. The
small number of cases in this vein, in comparison with the large number
of cases imposing liability for insufficient collateral,15 ° seems to suggest
that most courts frowned on board decisions to squander security. Nev-
ertheless, before the 1980s, the few decisions that specifically addressed
this issue largely went the other way and courts in other jurisdictions
were powerless to prevent those rogue rulings. Thus, federal agencies
were compelled to intervene after inconsistent judicial enforcement
threatened to gut otherwise sensible common law rules.
146. An early case to this effect was Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Sav. Bank, 75 F.
781 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896), in which a shareholder sued the bank's directors for delinquent
loans to an important local merchant. Id. at 783. The directors were charged, among other
things, with refusing to record a mortgage on the merchant's property because they be-
lieved "it would injure [the merchant's] credit." Id. at 784. In the eyes of the court, that
was a matter for the board's business judgment; "the failure to record the real estate mort-
gage did not entail a loss of more than $500 or $600, and was induced by the honest belief
that the credit of the debtor, and therefore his ability to pay the whole debt, would be
promoted .... " Id. at 787; see also Castetter v. Barnard, 183 N.E. 681, 686 (Ind. App.
1932) (noting that a cashier had the right to renew a secured note without requiring contin-
ued security); Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 20 (Pa. 1872) (affirming dismissal of complaint
against directors despite their "vain attempt to sustain their credit ... [by sacrificing] secur-
ities and collaterals").
147. 18 A. 824 (N.J. Ch. 1889).
148. Id. at 834.
149. 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A; id.
pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A; FDIC v. Schreiner, 892 F. Supp. 869, 876 (W.D. Tex. 1995);
Stanley, 770 F. Supp. at 1313; FDIC v. Robertson, No. 87-2623-S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9292, at *7-*8, *17-*18 (D. Kan. July 24, 1989), modified on other grounds, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13017 (D. Kan. Oct. 23, 1989); Omnibank v. United Southern Bank, 607 So. 2d 76,
87 (Miss. 1992). Failing to perfect security interests is a standard allegation in bank direc-
tor negligence claims today. See Eureka Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. American Casualty
Co., 873 F.2d 229, 234-35 (9th Cir. 1989) (negligence complaint against thrift directors al-
leged failure to perfect security interests).
150. Compare supra notes 106-07, 109 with note 146 and accompanying text.
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b. Actions on default
The judiciary's oversight of bank responses to loan arrearages is inter-
esting in two respects. First, the judiciary's approach mixes bans on for-
bearance with broad deference to workout efforts after foreclosure, a
channeling device that is designed to force banks to put nonperforming
loans into collection. Second, this is one of the few areas of common law
banking regulation in which bans comport with industry custom and thus
largely work.
(1) Bans on forbearance
Historically, courts have given directors wide berth in handling loans in
arrears. That discretion included whether to institute collection efforts at
all. More recently, however, courts have instituted bans on loan forbear-
ance, broadly defined as actions designed to postpone collection of a non-
performing loan.
The first such forbearance technique involves the extension or renewal
of delinquent loans. Extensions and renewals pose the concern that de-
lays could result in reduced recoveries while masking defaults on the fi-
nancial institution's books. For this reason, courts in New Jersey and
Virginia in 1889 held bank directors liable for renewing loans in arrears
instead of demanding immediate repayment.'51 For virtually a century
after those decisions, however, other courts continued to invoke the busi-
ness judgment rule to protect bankers from liability for renewals, so long
as the loans appeared collectible when originally made.' 5 '
151. Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 838 (N.J. Ch. 1889); Marshall v. Farmers' &
Mechanics' Sav. Bank, 8 S.E. 586, 587-88, 591-92 (Va. 1889). Some commentators explain
Marshall as a case that would have imposed liability on duty of loyalty grounds had the
evidence been stronger. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
452 (1973); Phillips, supra note 34, at 204-08 (noting that the renewals were for check
overdrafts by the bank's president, the bank's cashier, and one of its directors). Addition-
ally, Marshall involved a savings bank where, unlike commercial banks, depositor interests
were paramount. See McCoy, supra note 5, at 39-43.
152. Ford v. Taylor, 4 S.W.2d 938, 940-41 (Ark. 1928) (noting that "the renewals of such
loans appear to have resulted from bad judgment only .... ); Castetter v. Barnard, 183
N.E. 681 (Ind. App. 1932). In reversing the trial court's finding of negligence as to a loan,
the Castetter court stated, "[t]he fact that ... [the cashier] accepted renewals of the note
without security or failed to press the same for collection at maturity out of consideration
for his father is insufficient to predicate a breach of the bond thereon." Id. at 686; see also
Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 290 S.W. 346, 346-47 (Ky. 1926) (reversing judgment against
director for recommending bad loan that was renewed repeatedly).
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Today, some courts deem extensions and renewals negligent. 153 Re-
cently, however, in Washington Bancorporation v. Said,'54 the court de-
ferred to a forbearance decision where collection would reduce the
prospects for recovery.155 There, a bank officer won summary judgment
on the defense that he did not call a loan to a law firm because it would
have thrown the firm into bankruptcy.' 56 Thus, Washington Bancorpora-
tion reflects a lingering deference to the officer's choice of workout tech-
niques where justifications for forbearance exist.
In sum, extensions and renewals are generally viewed with disapproval,
tempered by a willingness to tolerate forbearance in rare, justifiable cir-
cumstances. Interestingly, the 1992 federal real estate regulations and
guidelines do not supplant this law, or remedy the past century's hiatus in
enforcement, by imposing an independent, substantive standard. Rather,
the rules are procedural and simply require federally insured institutions
to adopt internal policies on extensions for real estate loans.' 57 With reg-
ulatory standards lacking, the common law may continue to dominate
substantive standards of conduct for bank directors in this area.
In a related vein, courts were hesitant to adjudge additional loans to
defaulting borrowers as negligent, particularly loans to tide over promi-
nent businessmen. In Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Savings Bank, 58
the court relied on the business judgment rule to exonerate directors who
had advanced funds to the largest local merchant "for the purpose of
postponing impending failure," despite its belief that "this was not good
banking."' 59 Similarly, in Litwin v. Allen,'1 6 the court refused to fault
bank directors for making substantial new advances to a pair of promi-
nent millionaires who could not repay past loans.161
153. See FDIC v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1324-25 (5th Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Schreiner, 892
F. Supp. 869, 875-76 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding loan rollovers potentially negligent); FDIC
v. Robertson, No. 87-2623-S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292, at *14-*19 (D. Kan. July 24,
1989); cf. Bank of Dixie v. FDIC, 766 F.2d 175, 176 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming FDIC
cease-and-desist order against a bank in part due to charges that "loans had been renewed
or their due dates had been extended without collection in cash of interest due").
154. 812 F. Supp. 1256 (D.D.C. 1993).
155. Id. at 1270 (refusing to hold bank official responsible for a deliberate decision to
forestall collection from a prominent customer).
156. Id. (noting that the directors consulted with other creditors).
157. 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A; id.
pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A.
158. 75 F. 781 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896).
159. Id. at 784. Professor Tamar Frankel has described this risk "as old as banking
itself." See Tamar Frankel, Corporate Directors' Duty of Care: The American Law Insti-
tute's Project on Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 705, 713 (1984).
160. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
161. Id. at 724, 726-28 (explaining that "[sjecured loans made in good faith for the
purpose of tiding the borrower over a time of financial embarrassment are not, for that
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Other Depression-era cases, however, condemned advances to delin-
quent borrowers as negligent. 162 Today, at least in the case of real estate
loans, such advances are contrary to the 1992 federal rules requiring bor-
rowers to be capable of adequately servicing their debts.163 Like bans on
extensions and renewals, bans on advances to delinquent borrowers are
justified in all but the most unusual cases. Such bans comport with indus-
try practice' 64 and employ a technique that is familiar to the courts. Simi-
larly, the bright-line nature of such bans makes them easy for bankers to
follow without the need for counsel. Accordingly, courts may continue to
play an important role in formulating and administering such bans.
(2) Workout Techniques Following Foreclosure
Once boards institute foreclosure, courts give them wide discretion to
dispose of foreclosed property. Assuming there are no statutory viola-
tions, courts penalize workout efforts only where the disputed decisions
are certain to compound losses. Otherwise, loan workout decisions are
one of the last great remnants of the business judgment rule in bank
lending.
Courts consistently have declined to impose liability for decisions to
liquidate foreclosed assets that result in losses. 165 Similarly, courts have
refused to penalize decisions to hold foreclosed property in hopes that
the market would improve, instead of selling it immediately.'
66
reason, negligent .... "); accord Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 894 (6th Cir. 1938)
(absolving bank directors for making additional loans to a company that could not pay off
prior loans and characterizing their decision as "sound judgment").
162. See Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1943) (affirming as negli-
gent a board chairman's decision to approve the bank's purchase of $200,000 in bonds in an
effort to recapitalize a defaulting borrower); Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 197 N.E. 649,
660 (Mass. 1935) (finding officers liable for advancing loans without analyzing the capacity
for repayment in light of firm's past trouble in repaying larger loans).
163. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A;
id. pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A.
164. See LANGSTON, supra note 119, at 196-97; see also JOHN H. SAVAGE, BANK Au-
DITS AND EXAMINATIONS 80-81 (1973).
165. Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F.2d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 1931) (affirming holding that direc-
tors who foreclosed on mortgaged farms at a loss did not commit negligence); Washington
Bancorp. v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1263-64 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that bank directors
were entitled to sell foreclosed property "as soon as [they] could recoup [the bank's] 'in-
vestment' and expended costs, .... " even if sales price was below the appraised value);
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667,736 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (upholding directors' decision to
liquidate collateral comprised of stock at a public auction as "a proper exercise of business
judgment").
166. See Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 895-96 (6th Cir. 1938) (holding that bank
directors had discretion to hold foreclosed stock instead of selling it); Wallace v. Lincoln
Sav. Bank, 15 S.W. 448, 451 (Tenn. 1891) (overturning part of judgment against directors
because "the probability seems to be that in bidding the debts upon the lands, and holding
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Courts also have deferred to board judgment where the foreclosed col-
lateral consisted of a business that required cash infusions to remain a
going concern. At least two reported decisions have refused to condemn
bank directors for authorizing further cash outlays to operate a fore-
closed business. In Atherton v. Anderson, 6 7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that where the foreclosed collateral
"is a manufacturing establishment whose value depends substantially
upon uninterrupted operation, we think implied power exists to continue
such operation for a time providing the primary purpose of the bank is to
save its debt rather than to speculate in future profits, and there is rea-
sonable prospect of realization."' 68 And while eventual plans to sell with
a "reasonable prospect of realization" were key, the decision of how long
to operate before losses had to be cut was left to the directors' business
discretion.' 69
A similar result occurred in Gallin v. National City Bank, 7 ° which ap-
proved a board decision to salvage loans to the Cuban sugar industry by
operating sugar mills instead of liquidating them. 7' In the judgment of
the court, the "final test [was] one of fact, not of law":
Was the salvage operation, though incidentally involving acts of
management or improvement, in fact carried on in good faith to
render the properties valuable to secure liquidation of the
debts? Or was it in fact a mere cover to enable the bank to
engage in a business for ulterior purpose?' 7 2
The court exonerated the directors for approving the salvage operation
because the directors "were convinced that the bank and its stock holders
would lose more by walking away from Cuban sugar loans than by at-
tempting to save them."'1 73
for a better market, the bank's officers did what the most prudent and sagacious would
have done at the time, and under the same circumstances"). For national banks, the maxi-
mum time that foreclosed real estate may be held is prescribed by statute. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 29 (1994); 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.81-34.87 (1995) (prescribing various methods of determining
the holding period).
167. 86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 643 (1937) (per
curiam).
168. Id. at 525 (citing cases).
169. Id.
170. 273 N.Y.S. 87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934).
171. Id. at 104-07.
172. Id. at 105 (noting that the burden was on the plaintiffs to show that the capital was
advanced for ulterior purposes).
173. Id. at 105-06 (finding that "the salvage efforts were important in [collecting the $66
million debt] ... [and] the mere fact that the mills operated enabled merchants to make
payments that would otherwise have been impossible"). In contrast, courts have found
negligence where bank operation of foreclosed businesses violates a state statute. See
Stone v. Rottman, 82 S.W. 76, 78-79, 83-85 (Mo. 1904).
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Each of these decisions properly awarded deference because the direc-
tors faced uncertainty about which course would cut or magnify losses. In
contrast, courts have come down harshly on workout techniques that are
certain to increase losses, particularly when those decisions entail addi-
tional injections of cash. Courts routinely hold bank directors negligent
for decisions to buy out a senior mortgage at an increased loss simply to
preserve a junior mortgage. 74 Similarly, in Michelsen v. Penney, 75 a
bank officer was held liable for attempting to revive a defaulting corpo-
rate borrower by subscribing to an additional $200,000 in the company's
stocks and bonds.' 76 Since the Depression, federally insured banks have
been prohibited from such bail-out investments under the Glass-Steagall
Act.'
77
Subject to these exceptions, loan workouts remain one of the few areas
in bank lending where board decisions still receive deference from courts
and federal regulators. The law in this area is primarily judge-made with
relatively little policing under federal statutes or regulations. That is not
because there is assurance that deference works (in the sense of maximiz-
ing recovery). Rather, deference is most likely due to the fact that fed-
eral bank regulators confront the same uncertainty and judgment calls
when disposing of foreclosed property in their capacity as conservators or
receivers. Accordingly, the common law, and specifically the business
judgment rule, continues to play a pre-eminent role in loan workout
efforts.
In sum, the business judgment rule has contracted significantly in the
realm of bank lending. Most aspects of bank lending are now subject to
substantive judicial review. The most significant exception in the lending
area involves creditworthiness determinations, assuming, of course, that
the relevant information has been gathered and analyzed. Most workout
methods also receive protection under the business judgment rule, as do
interest-free check overdrafts to disinterested customers. Additionally,
courts have generally abstained from imposing duties of care for certain
areas of banking concern other than lending, such as deposit-taking and
capital adequacy. Several conclusions can be drawn from the judiciary's
century-long experiment with substantive bank board regulation.
First, with two prominent exceptions, the judiciary has veered away
from incorporating economic or financial analysis into common law liabil-
ity tests. The first exception consists of the collateral parity cases, where
174. Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 421-22 (2d Cir. 1943); Williams v. McKay, 18 A.
824, 830-31 (N.J. Ch. 1889).
175. 135 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1943).
176. Id. at 425-26.
177. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 335, 1831a (1994); 12 C.F.R. pts. 333, 362 (1995).
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courts for years side-stepped the problem of financial analysis by taking
evidence of collateral parity at face value.178 The second exception con-
sists of the "minimum rationality" cases such as Hun v. Cary1 79 that bar
transactions with no potential for profit. But after the controversial lia-
bility holding in Litwin v. Allen,180 many questioned the judiciary's com-
petence to distinguish potentially profitable transactions from
unprofitable ones. As a result, at least in banking, the minimum rational-
ity cases fell into virtual disuse. Significantly, this experience did not
cause courts to conclude that the "minimum rationality" cases chilled
bank board decisions. Instead, courts searched for other ways to regulate
risky banking practices.
In search of workable methods, a few courts experimented with bans
on specific activities or classes of collateral."' The appeal of such bans
lies in their bright-line approach. But as the record in banking makes
clear, activity bans eventually fly apart in the centrifuge of market forces.
The major problem is that when one state adopts a ban based on national
bank precedents, sister states almost never copy it because preserving the
status quo gives home-chartered banks a competitive advantage over in-
stitutions in the stricter state. Bans are doubly unpopular because they
are too heavy-handed: they outlaw potentially valuable services when
lesser regulation might suffice. In addition, bans can create an unlevel
playing field by subjecting affected financial institutions to customer raids
by non-bank firms in the banned industry.
Consequently, most courts rejected activity bans in favor of other com-
mon law regulatory techniques. Those techniques, however, were
plagued by the same "race to the bottom" problem as the state court
activity bans.1 82 Most failed for a variety of other reasons as well. Some,
such as judicial loan-to-one-borrower limitations and loan-to-value rul-
ings, were so vague and uncertain that legislatures overrode them by en-
178. See supra notes 105-20 and accompanying text (discussing the collateral parity
rule).
179. 82 N.Y. 65 (N.Y. 1880).
180. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
181. See supra notes 42-83 and accompanying text.
182. The latest example consists of recent bank director liability holdings in Texas and
elsewhere to the effect that the business judgment rule is displaced only in circumstances
entailing at least gross negligence, defined as a "complete abdication of responsibilities," a
"fail[ure] to exercise judgment," ultra vires acts, self-dealing, or fraud. RTC v. Acton, 844
F. Supp. 307, 313-16 (N.D. Tex. 1994), aff'd, 49 F.3d 1086 (5th Cir. 1995); accord FDIC v.
Harrington, 844 F. Supp. 300, 305-07 (N.D. Tex. 1994); RTC v. Hovnanian, Civ. No. 94-450
(HLS), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19359, at *16-*24 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 1994). See also supra
note 9; Dord, supra note 1, at 179 n.190 (cataloguing new state statutes applying gross
negligence standard to actions brought by the FDIC); Stevens & Nielson, supra note 1, at
194-208 (same).
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acting quantitative statutory tests. Other tests that were easy to
administer and follow, particularly the collateral parity rules, lapsed into
irrelevance because they did not account for the effects of possible future
business downturns. Still others succumbed because they were stronger
medicine than the problem required.
Due to these and other enforcement problems, judicial attempts to reg-
ulate substantive bank board decisions have withered on the vine. As it
turned out, the problem with substantive bank regulation by the courts
was as much underenforcement as overenforcement, due to geographic
limits on the reach of common law rules. In an effort to correct this prob-
lem, federal code-based standards with nationwide effect have preempted
almost every banking topic that the common law duty of care sought to
supervise.183 This shift to code-based standards similarly alleviated local
concerns with overenforcement by substituting quantitative standards for
vague common law tests and individualized financial analyses for outright
activity bans. At the same time, the new codified standards take a leaf
from the common law experience that common law rules work best when
derived from industry practice. Hence, there is a new emphasis on
"growing" industry standards by requiring banks to formulate and follow
their own underwriting procedures and internal controls. This new em-
phasis is plainly evident both from recent federal regulations and the new
monitoring duty cases.
III. PROCEDURAL COMMON LAW REGULATION
In one sense, judicially-imposed monitoring duties in the banking in-
dustry are nothing new. For over one hundred years, courts have re-
peated Briggs' adage that bank directors have a "duty of reasonable
supervision" that "includes something more than officiating as figure-
heads."'" Until recently, this duty mostly meant showing up at meetings,
hiring decent managers, and heeding warning signs.185 In the past five
183. See 136 CONG. REC. S7697-7701 (daily ed. June 11, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Riegle) (explaining that FIRREA "placed important new restrictions on State powers.
Prior to FIRREA's enactment, State law alone provided the only limitations on the powers
of State-chartered thrifts. . . .In several States, those limitations were not very substan-
tial"); cf Lawrence G. Baxter, Administrative and Judicial Review of Prompt Corrective
Action Decisions by The Federal Banking Regulators, 7 ADMIN. L.J. 505,528 (1993) (noting
increased formality in federal banking regulation).
184. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 165 (1891); accord RTC v. Young, 93 Civ. 6531
(LMM), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13383, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1995) (observing that to
"obtain the benefit of the business judgment rule," directors have a duty to monitor bank
management).
185. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 71, at 5-6, 11-13. Two recent, controversial cases
appear to override the traditional duty to heed financial warning signs. In FDIC v. Stahl,
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years, however, courts repeatedly have held directors liable for disregard-
ing or altogether dispensing with underwriting standards and internal
controls. The three principal areas that have undergone scrutiny are un-
derwriting procedures, deliberative processes, and loan administration.
Until recently, most courts placed little importance on underwriting
procedures and routinely excused failures to adopt them or to monitor
compliance.186 But in the aftermath of last decade's bank and thrift crisis,
the judiciary's hands-off attitude toward procedural safeguards evapo-
rated. Over the past five years, numerous courts have ruled that the fail-
ure to establish or comply with underwriting procedures can give rise to
liability in bank director negligence cases.187 Similarly, the 1992 real es-
854 F. Supp. 1565, 1570-71 (S.D. Fla. 1994), and FDIC v. Benson, 867 F. Supp. 512, 520-25
(S.D. Tex. 1994), courts recently relied on the business judgment rule in declining to hold
directors negligent for failing to correct loan problems flagged in supervisory agreements
or reports of examination. These cases are wrongly decided, most importantly because
they perversely encourage directors to resist taking corrective measures when they are
notified of violations. See FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1433-34 & n.9, 1436 (7th Cir.
1993) (explaining that "[r]eliance arguments are especially weak when regulators have told
directors to take action"); FDIC v. Daniel, No. 1: 92-CV-347, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6940,
at *10 & n.7 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 1995) (holding that repeated failures to comply with bank
examiner recommendations could constitute gross negligence); RTC v. Norris, 830 F. Supp.
351, 360 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (refusing to dismiss negligence claim because plaintiff had "al-
leged the type of 'prolonged failure to exercise oversight or supervision' that falls outside
the business judgment rule as a failure to exercise any judgment"). Additionally, Benson
involved serious self-dealing charges that would not merit business judgment rule protec-
tion in any case. 867 F. Supp. at 522-23 (discussing illegal insider loans, in violation of 12
U.S.C. § 1972 and 12 C.F.R. § 215, and check overdraft violations by insiders, in violation
of 12 U.S.C. § 375b); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the duty of
loyalty).
186. In Gamble v. Brown, for example, the directors prevailed even though the court
deemed it "no doubt irregular to discount the note [at issue] without securing the approval
of the discount committee or of the board." 29 F.2d 366, 380 (4th Cir. 1928), cert. denied,
279 U.S. 839 (1929). More recently, in First National Bank v. Keller, a bank director was
absolved for approving worthless loans "without the required prior approval of the Loan
and Discount Committee and without the knowledge of any other Bank director or of-
ficer." 318 F. Supp. 339, 347 (N.D. II1. 1970). Banking cases lagged behind general corpo-
rate law in this respect.
The only significant exception to this pattern in banking was Gilson v. Cambridge Sav-
ings Bank, where the court declined to enforce a loan contract because only one member
of the board of investment had certified the value of the collateral, not two. 62 N.E. 728,
728-29 (Mass. 1902); cf Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 89 N.E. 476, 478-79, 480-84
(N.Y. 1909) (holding a contract invalid where board failed to approve it, in violation of
state statute and by-laws). Gilson, however, turned on violations of state statute. 62 N.E.
at 728.
187. See Bierman, 2 F.3d at 1436-37 (holding that "[d]irectors are also charged with
knowledge of the loan policies in effect during their watch"); FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124,
129 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming negligence judgment against bank director who ap-
proved a loan in violation of loan procedures that he himself had drafted); Eureka Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. American Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 229, 234 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that
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tate loan regulations require banks and thrifts to establish detailed lend-
ing and compliance procedures for all real estate loans."8
A second and related line of cases scrutinizes the deliberative process
in loan decisions. In older cases, if there was "nothing in the record to
show whether ... loans were collectible apart from the collateral," courts
generally treated these loans as valid unless other information in the loan
application raised doubts about collectibility.' 89 In contrast, recent courts
have faulted bank directors for failing to obtain, verify, or sufficiently an-
alyze financial and other information about borrowers before approving
loans.' 90 The 1992 real estate loan guidelines track these cases and re-
"[t]he alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.., include funding loans without approval...");
RTC v. Gladstone, No. 93-11255-NG, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11619, at *6, *9, *36-*37 (D.
Mass. July 18, 1995) (holding business judgment rule did not bar negligence recovery for
failure to observe loan approval procedures); RTC v. Fortunato, No. 94 C 2090, 1994 WL
478616, at *3 (N.D. I11. Sept. 1, 1994) (holding that gross negligence claims for failing to
follow thrift procedures withstood motion to dismiss); RTC v. Ascher, No. 92-B-424, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1827, at *21 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 1994) (declining to award summary judg-
ment to defendants because they knew of internal control deficiencies), modified on other
grounds, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2699 (D. Colo. Feb. 25, 1994); FDIC v. Gonzalez-Gor-
rondona, 833 F. Supp. 1545, 1561 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding that the business judgment rule
does not apply where directors failed "to establish proper monitoring procedures"); FDIC
v. Brown, 812 F. Supp. 722, 726 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (refusing to dismiss gross negligence
claims based on abdicating managerial responsibilities); FDIC v. Robertson, No. 87-2623-
S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292, at *3, *13-*20 (D. Kan. July 24, 1989) (holding bank direc-
tors liable for over $5.4 million in bad loans that violated the bank's lending policy), modi-
fied on other grounds, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13017 (D. Kan. Oct. 23, 1989); cf. RTC v.
Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (D. Utah 1993) (alleging negligent failure "to institute a
reasonable and adequate loan policy..."). But see RTC v. Blasdell, No. CIV 93-199 PHX
RCB, 1994 WL 583131, at *9 (D. Ariz. Sept. 15, 1994) (reasoning that -[e]nacting deficient
policies ... falls well short of acting grossly negligent [sic] and certainly does not demon-
strate abdication"; grant of summary judgment for defendants).
188. 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A; id.
pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A; accord 60 Fed. Reg. 35,674, 35,679 (1995).
189. Gause, 89 N.E. at 480; see Keller, 318 F. Supp. at 348 (relieving bank director of
liability for negligence even though "[t]here was little evidence offered as to the soundness
of the loans to these borrowers").
190. For instance, in FDIC v. Robertson, a bank director was assessed with a multi-
million dollar judgment for "fail[ing] to obtain current, accurate financial information"
about borrowers and failing to verify or analyze financial information that was provided
before approving and renewing loans. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292, at *4, *7-*8, *14-*18;
see RTC v. Eason, 17 F.3d 1126, 1133 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming jury verdict for defendant
directors based partly on sufficient review of loan documentation); FDIC v. Schreiner, 892
F. Supp. 869, 875-77 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (denying director defendants summary judgment on
business judgment rule grounds where FDIC presented evidence of shoddy loan applica-
tion analysis); Gladstone, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11619, at *5, *9, *36-*37 (holding failure
to analyze repayment prospects adequately not protected by business judgment rule); RTC
v. Gravee, No. 94 C 4589, 1995 WL 75373, at *1, *5 (N.D. III. Feb. 22, 1995) (denying
motion to dismiss gross negligence claim for failing to verify loan information); RTC v.
Rahn, 854 F. Supp. 480, 491 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (denying summary judgment for defend-
ants where evidence showed they approved residential construction loan without obtaining
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quire banks to analyze "all relevant credit factors," including cash flow,
creditworthiness, collateral value, the amount of borrower's equity, other
sources of repayment, and additional guarantees. 91
The final line of cases goes beyond the approval process and examines
loan administration post-approval. Earlier cases did not concern them-
selves with administration of loans.192 More recently, however, in FDIC
v. Robertson, 1 a director was held liable for failing to establish a loan
repayment plan.'9 Modern directors have been faulted as well for ap-
proving loan disbursements "without completing adequate inspection re-
ports to show that the disbursements were warranted.' 95 The 1992 real
estate loan rules expand these holdings and require federally insured in-
feasibility studies or presale agreements); RTC v. Lucas, No. 92-1317, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9892, at *14-*15 (C.D. I11. Mar. 25, 1993) (overruling motion to dismiss on business
judgment rule grounds where plaintiff alleged that defendants had "breached a duty to
make informed judgments..."); RTC v. Norris, 830 F. Supp. 351,355, 360 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(declining to dismiss negligence claims for not properly analyzing borrower financial state-
ments or obtaining feasibility studies); Hess, 820 F. Supp. at 1361 (where RTC sued a
thrift's former directors for allegedly failing "to investigate potential borrowers ...");
Omnibank v. United Southern Bank, 607 So. 2d 76, 86-87 (Miss. 1992) (holding that bank
loan to borrower in financial distress was gross negligence); cf. First State Bank v. FDIC,
770 F.2d 81, 82-83 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming FDIC cease-and-desist order against a bank
for unsafe and unsound lending practices, including failing to obtain sufficient financial
information on the borrower); 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, § 4.01(c)(2) &
comment d. But see FDIC v. Stahl, 854 F. Supp. 1565, 1571 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (directing
verdict, on business judgment rule grounds, for director defendants who approved com-
mercial loans without obtaining audited financial statements, sales histories, or feasibility
studies); Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1172 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that
business judgment rule protected sloppy deliberations); Noble v. Baum, No. CV 89
0265920 S, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1231, at *6-*7, *40-*41 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 6,
1991) (holding that business judgment rule shielded lax loan underwriting practices so as to
require shareholder demand).
191. 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A; id.
pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A; accord 60 Fed. Reg. 35,674, 35,679 (1995).
192. In Pocomoke City National Bank v. Crockett, for example, the Maryland Court of
Appeals ruled for the directors despite what it termed "glaring" irregularities in crediting
the proceeds of a disputed note to someone other than the payee. 125 A. 712, 714-16 (Md.
1924); see Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan & Sav. Bank, 75 F. 781, 787, 789 (C.C.D.S.C.
1896) (excusing procedural irregularities in failing to record a mortgage on real estate of a
borrower who later defaulted).
193. No. 87-2623-S, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9292 (D. Kan. July 24, 1989).
194. Id. at *14-*19; see Schreiner, 892 F. Supp. at 875-77 (holding that failure to estab-
lish loan repayment program was potentially negligent); cf. First State Bank, 770 F.2d at 82
(affirming FDIC cease-and-desist order based in part on charges that the bank "fail[ed] to
establish and enforce programs for the repayment of loans..."); Bank of Dixie v. FDIC,
766 F.2d 175, 176 & n.1, 177 (5th Cir. 1985) (same).
195. FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184, 1191 (D. Md. 1984); see subsequent opinion,
622 F. Supp. 132, 133 (D. Md. 1985) (jury found directors liable), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds sub nom. FSLIC v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1987). Accord
RTC v. Rahn, 854 F. Supp. 480,490 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (denying summary judgment where
defendants had continued to fund construction costs for two years without obtaining up-
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stitutions to establish detailed internal procedures for the administration
of real estate loans. 196
This new emphasis on procedural safeguards and deliberative processes
in bank director liability law mirrors a similar shift in corporate law at
large. 97 Yet in some respects, it is surprising that the courts did not
embrace mandatory bank procedural safeguards sooner, given their early
forays into substantive bank regulation. If courts were concerned about
undue intrusion into bank board decisions, and if monitoring duties are
less intrusive than substantive rules, why then did earlier courts reject
monitoring duties while adopting substantive rules?
The answer lies in the judiciary's evolving perceptions of the role
played by bank directors. In the early nineteenth century, bank directors
commonly made the final decision on loan applications. That function
began to be delegated to bank officers in the mid-1800s.' 98 Today, bank
boards almost never review loan applications, given the volume and time-
sensitivity of most bank loans.
Judicial perceptions of how the loan process worked lagged far behind,
however, and did not catch up for decades. In the meantime, when courts
imposed direct substantive duties on directors, they did so in the belief
that directors were the ones who made final decisions on loans. Later,
when courts began to incorporate into the law the realization that most
bank directors had nothing to do with approving individual loans, it be-
came apparent that the only fair way to hold directors liable for violation
of the judiciary's substantive standards was to hold them legally responsi-
ble for incorporating those rules into internal underwriting standards and
monitoring compliance.' 99 In this regard, it is significant that when pro-
cedural holdings expanded in the 1980s, substantive judicial regulation
dated appraisals); Norris, 830 F. Supp. at 355, 360-61 (refusing to dismiss gross negligence
claims based in part on directors' alleged failure to monitor loan disbursements properly).
196. 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A (1995); id. pt. 208, app. C; id. pt. 365, app. A; id.
pt. 563, subpt. D, app. A.
197. See generally Victor Brudney, The Independent Director - Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 632 (1982) (discussing the board's duty to moni-
tor management so as to protect shareholders); Cohn, supra note 2, at 609 (discussing
scholarly literature debunking myth that outside directors are hands-on managers); Eisen-
berg, supra note 13, at 329, 332-36 (explaining action that is reasonably necessary to satisfy
monitoring requirements); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in
the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375, 378-80
(1975) (discussing practical constraints on boards' ability to manage); Frankel, supra note
159, at 710-12 (arguing that courts adjust directors' duty of care to take their time con-
straints into account).
198. See I FRITZ REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING: MEN AND IDEAS
17-20, 55-64 (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1968) (1951); II REDLICH, supra, at 12.
199. See GARTEN, supra note 6, at 93.
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also continued to expand. 00 Thus, far from supplanting substantive judi-
cial regulation of bank lending, the new procedural cases supplement it.
In other respects, the procedure cases reveal a new philosophy, one
that gives banks latitude to adopt and interpret their own substantive un-
derwriting standards in lieu of imposing those standards from above.
This philosophy applies most noticeably to bank decisions that fall in the
interstices of the substantive rules and is best exemplified by the 1992 real
estate lending rules. In several key respects, the 1992 rules eschew sub-
stantive rules in favor of standards requiring banks to adopt their own
procedures addressing a detailed list of mandatory factors.201 In this
sense, the emphasis on procedural safeguards represents a distinct inno-
vation in regulatory techniques, away from externally imposed rules to-
ward ones that are internally generated.
This latter development is a reaction to the fact that judicially man-
dated rules do not work well unless they are modeled on traditional bank
industry practices and have some internal support from the banking in-
dustry itself. By pressing banks to adopt detailed internal procedures, the
hope is that the banking industry as a whole will tighten its standards,
thereby generating internal industry pressure for enforcement.
There are possible advantages to this philosophy. First, it helps avoid
the danger that outside regulators will impose overly onerous rules that
disregard business realities. Second, it capitalizes on the power of at least
partial industry consensus in achieving enforcement. Finally, assuming
industry standards improve, those standards will establish new substan-
tive standards for tort liability.
At the same time, this philosophy poses decided risks. Lax underwrit-
ing procedures were a serious problem in the recent past. Thus, absent
external pressure, there is little reason to expect banks to adopt effective
procedures and internal controls in the future. Such pressure can come
from several sources, most notably from bank examiners, outside audi-
tors, bank counsel and D&O insurers. But all of these monitors have
their limitations, the most important being that they generally review
bank decisions after the fact and after any harm already has accrued. In
200. The 1980s and 1990s ushered in a slew of new holdings condemning loans outside a
bank's customary lending area, unduly risky collateral, pre-funded interest clauses, non-
recourse loans, and extensions in lieu of default. See supra notes 102, 135-37, 141-44, 153
and accompanying text.
201. For example, in lieu of imposing substantive standards, the guidelines require in-
sured financial institutions to identify geographic areas in which they will lend and to
formulate internal limits on the use of nonrecourse loans, interest reserves, and loan for-
bearance. See supra notes 103, 143-44, 157 and accompanying text. The rules even give
banks latitude under certain circumstances to depart from loan-to-value ratios. See supra
note 125.
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addition, each of those monitors is subject to external pressure, either
from the regulated banks, competitors, or other forces. Thus, because
effective external oversight is not assured, regulatory requirements that
substitute process for substantive standards may prove to be no standards
at all.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the judiciary's regulation of bank decisions through negligence
law is analyzed, the results refute a number of commonly-held assump-
tions about the business judgment rule. In the banking industry, the
"minimum rationality" decisions were merely a prelude to substantive ju-
dicial oversight of potentially profitable decisions. Similarly, monitoring
duties followed substantive regulation instead of supplanting or preced-
ing it. Contrary to expectations, the banking industry also is replete with
instances of judicial supervision of day-to-day decisions.
Above all, the banking experience affords valuable insights into the
central rationale for the business judgment rule, i.e., the avoidance of risk
aversion. The business judgment rule proceeds on the assumption that
corporate directors will be overly risk-averse if they face negligence lia-
bility for decisions that are honest but mistaken. Put differently, the rule
assumes that directors will consciously reduce the amount of risk they are
willing to accept where state courts have assessed directors with liability
for risky decisions in the past.
The opposite, however, proved true in banking. By the 1980s, court
decisions imposing liability for breach of the duty of care, and thus in
derogation of the business judgment rule, had been on the books for
years. Nonetheless, the existence of those cases did not deter disastrous
banking practices in the 1980s. To the contrary, scores of bank directors
acted as if those cases did not exist.
This suggests that in a state-law duty-of-care regime, director liability
holdings may not inject risk aversion into boardroom behavior over the
long term. Furthermore, many of the reasons that explain this phenome-
non in banking apply to other industries at large. Most industries are
subject to the same competitive pressures that militate against wide-
spread adoption of isolated state-law liability holdings and that ultimately
cause those holdings to fall into disuse. Similarly, the regulatory tech-
niques at the judiciary's disposal are prone to the same inadequacies no
matter what industry is involved. To this extent, then, the banking indus-
try's experience is instructive for industries across the board.
At the same time, the banking experience raises the question whether
other factors motivating the judiciary's regulation of substantive banking
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decisions are so unique as to be inapplicable to other industries. Com-
mentators have so assumed, without examining the economic fundamen-
tals of the banking industry or the common law's enforcement rationales
in any rigorous sense.
Certainly the judiciary's increasing activism in the common law regula-
tion of banks (and the fact that common law regulation almost always
triggers statutory regulation when it fails) suggests that banking is "spe-
cial" in some way. That is the beginning of the inquiry, however, not the
end. Before one can conclude that banking is special, the economic in-
centive structure of the industry must be dissected and the reasons for
judiciary's activism in this area discerned. Following that, it is necessary
to ask whether any of the factors that prompted the judiciary to embark
on common law regulation in banking exist to some extent in other indus-
tries. If so, it is worth examining the business judgment rule more closely
in those industries to determine if the rule contracted or was supplanted
by other regulatory mechanisms. By the same token, other regulated in-
dustries should be scrutinized to determine the extent to which regulation
displaced the business judgment rule and, if so, why.
The banking industry's banishment to the netherworld of thought
about business judgment rule was a serious oversight. The divergent evo-
lutionary path of the business judgment rule in banking yields a cornuco-
pia of unexpected insights regarding the effects of the rule's contraction.
Still further insights may emerge when the reasons for that divergent path
are examined.
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